When it comes to invocation of the powers vested in Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, unlike Section 438 Cr.P.C that has a statutory flavour, Article 136 confers plenary powers on Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases.

In Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham and Another[1], Supreme Court has expounded on the amplitude of its powers under Article 136 in the following words:

“4. ……Article 136 of the Constitution of India invests the Supreme Court with a plentitude of plenary, appellate power over all Courts and Tribunals in India. The power is plenary in the sense that there are no words in Article 136 itself qualifying that power. But, the very nature of the power has led the Court to set limits to itself within which to exercise such power.

It is now the well-established practice of Supreme Court to permit the invocation of the power under Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances, as when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court. But, within the restrictions imposed by itself, Supreme Court has the undoubted power to interfere even with findings of fact, making no distinction between judgments of acquittal and conviction, if the High Court, in arriving at those findings, has acted “perversely or otherwise improperly”.[2]

The ordinary Appellate powers of Supreme Court and Appellate Power under Article 136

Appellate power vested in the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution is not to be confused with ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate courts and Appellate Tribunals under specific statutes. It is a plenary power, ‘exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law’ to meet the pressing demands of justice[3].

Article 136 of the Constitution neither confers on anyone the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court nor inhibits anyone from invoking the Court’s jurisdiction. The power is vested in the Supreme Court but the right to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction is vested in no one. The exercise of the power of the Supreme Court is not circumscribed by any limitation as to who may invoke it. ………

Appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution are entertained by special leave granted by Supreme Court, whether it is the State or a private party that invokes the jurisdiction of Supreme Court, special leave is not granted as a matter of course but only for good and sufficient reasons, as well established by the practice of Supreme Court.”

Article 136 does not confer any Right of Appeal to anyone

In P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam[4], a Constitution Bench of five judges elaborated the content and character of Article 136 vis-à-vis Article 21 and made the following observations:

“7. Specificity being essential to legality, let us see if the broad spectrum spread out of Article 136 fills the bill from the point of view of “procedure established by law”. In express terms, Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on a party as such but it confers a wide discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases. The discretionary dimension is considerable but that relates to the power of the court. The question is whether it spells by implication, fair a procedure as contemplated by Article 21.

In our view, it does. Article 136 is a special jurisdiction. It is residuary power; it is extraordinary in its amplitude, its limit, when it chases injustice, is the sky itself. Supreme Court functionally fulfils itself by reaching out to injustice wherever it is and this power is largely derived in the common run of cases from Article 136. Is if merely a power in the court to be exercised in any manner it fancies? Is there no procedural limitation in the manner of exercise and the occasion for exercise? Is there no duty to act fairly while hearing a case under Article 136, either in the matter of grant of leave or, after such grant, in the final disposal of the appeal?

We have hardly any doubt that here is a procedure necessarily implicit in the power vested in the summit court. It must be remembered that Article 136 confers jurisdiction on the highest court. The founding fathers unarguably intended in the very terms of Article 136 that it shall be exercised by the highest judges of the land with scrupulous adherence to judicial principles well established by precedents in our jurisprudence. Judicial discretion is canalised authority, not arbitrary eccentricity….. xxxxx

10. Once we hold that Article 136 is a composite provision which vests a wide jurisdiction and, by the very fact of entrusting this unique jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, postulates, inarticulately though, the methodology of exercising that power, nothing more remains in the objection of the petitioner. It is open to the court to grant special leave and the subsequent process of hearing are (sic is) well established. Thus, there is an integral provision of power-cum-procedure which answers with the desideratum of Article 21 justifying deprivation of life and liberty.

In a concurring judgement in the captioned case, it was further observed that:

21. Plainly, the jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 seeks to confer on Supreme Court the widest conceivable range of judicial power, making it perhaps among the most powerful courts in the world. The judicial power reaches out to every judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order affecting the rights and obligations of persons in civil matters, of life and liberty in criminal matters as well as matters touching the Revenues of the State. It is an attempt to ensure that the foundations of the Indian Republic, which have been laid on the bedrock of justice, are not undermined by injustice anywhere in the land, Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of these Bharat Bank Ltd [1950 SCC 470 : AIR 1950 SC 188 : (1950) SCR 459, 474 : 1950 LLJ 21 : (1950-51) 2 FJR 1] .

As the court observed in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh [AIR 1954 SC 520 : (1955) 1 SCR 267, 272 : 9 ELR 494] Article 136 “vests in the Supreme Court a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals by grant of special leave”.

22. Nonetheless, there is a limitation which, in our opinion, is of immediate relevance. It is a limitation in-built in to the jurisdiction of the court and flows from the nature and character of the case intended to be brought before the court. It is a limitation which requires compliance despite the apparent plenitude of power vested in the court. When a petition is presented to the court under Article 136, the court will have due regard to the nature and character of the case sought to be brought before it when entertaining and disposing of the petition.

In Khoday Distilleries Limited and Others v. Mahadeshwara S.S.K. Limited[5], Supreme Court observed that Article 136 commences with a non-obstante clause, the words are of overriding effect and clearly indicate the intention of the framers of the Constitution that it is a special jurisdiction and a repository of residuary powers unfettered by any Statute or any provisions of Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution of India. It was also observed that the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution cannot be barred by the Statute since it is an extraordinary power.

In State of Punjab and others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) others[6], in the same strain, Supreme Court has held that Article 136 is a special jurisdiction and can be described as a ‘residuary power, extraordinary in its amplitude, its limits when it chases injustice, is the sky itself’. It is a corrective jurisdiction that vests a discretion in Supreme Court to settle the law clearly and makes the law operational thereby making it a binding precedent for the future instead of keeping it vague.

In Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh[7], Supreme Court commented on the circumstances in which the power under Article 136 is exercised and held thus:

“14. Before adverting to the merits of the contention raised, it is important to reiterate that Article 136 of the Constitution of India is an extraordinary jurisdiction which Supreme Court exercises when it entertains an appeal by special leave and this jurisdiction, by its very nature, is exercisable only when Supreme Court is satisfied that it is necessary to interfere in order to prevent grave or serious miscarriage of justice.

15. It is well settled by judicial pronouncement that Article 136 is worded in wide terms and powers conferred under the said Article are not hedged by any technical hurdles. This overriding and exceptional power is, however, to be exercised sparingly and only in furtherance of cause of justice. Thus, when the judgment under appeal has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice by some misapprehension or misreading of evidence or by ignoring material evidence then Supreme Court  is not only empowered but is well expected to interfere to promote the cause of justice.”

From the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that Article 136 can be invoked by a party in a petition for special leave to appeal from any judgement, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by a Court or Tribunal within the territory of India. The reach of the extraordinary powers vested in Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is boundless.

Such unbridled powers have been vested in Court, not just to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice as contemplated in Section 482, Cr.P.C, but to ensure dispensation of justice, correct errors of law, safeguard fundamental rights, exercise judicial review, resolve conflicting decisions, inject consistency in the legal system by settling precedents and for myriad other to undo injustice, wherever noticed and promote the cause of justice at every level. The fetters on this power are self-imposed and carefully tampered with sound judicial discretion.

Reference

M/s. Karnataka Emta coal mines limited versus Central Bureau of Investigation (2024)

[1] (1979) 2 SCC 297

[2] See State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer [AIR 1958 SC 61 : 1958 SCR 580 : 1958 Cri LJ 232] and Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash [(1972) 1 SCC 249 : (1972) 2 SCR 765]

[3] vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh [AIR 1954 SC 520 : (1955) 1 SCR 267 : 1954 SCJ 723]

[4] (1980) 3 SCC 141

[5]  (2012) 12 SCC 291

[6] AIR (2015) 1267

[7] (2022) 8 SCC 253