Introduction
On April 3, 2025, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh delivered a significant ruling in Preety v. Sumit Kumar Narwal (CR-7432-2024), a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The case involved a mother, Preety, challenging the Family Court’s refusal to grant her interim custody of her 3.5-year-old son, Aadhish, amidst a contentious marital dispute with her estranged husband, Sumit Kumar Narwal. The judgment, authored by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vikram Aggarwal, underscores the delicate interplay between statutory presumptions favoring maternal custody, prior agreements between parties, and the paramount consideration of a child’s welfare.
| Advocate for the petitioner | Mr. Sanjiv Kumar Aggarwal, Mr. Tejas Bansal |
| Advocate for the respondent | Mr. Ankit Chahal |
Factual Background
Preety and Sumit married on May 26, 2019, as per Hindu rites in Jind, Haryana, and welcomed their son, Aadhish, on December 16, 2021. Marital discord soon emerged, prompting the couple to file a mutual divorce petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA), on January 31, 2021. The joint statement recorded during the first motion included a critical term: Sumit would retain custody of Aadhish, and Preety would relinquish all future claims to custody or visitation rights. In exchange, Sumit agreed to pay Rs. 9,00,000 as permanent alimony, with half paid upfront.
However, the divorce process derailed when Preety, on March 16, 2024, withdrew her consent, alleging she was misled about the custody arrangement by her parents, who had handed Aadhish to Sumit under the pretense of a temporary meeting. The Family Court dismissed the divorce petition on April 15, 2024, and Sumit’s appeal remains pending. Meanwhile, Preety sought custody through a petition under Section 7 read with Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and moved an interim custody application, which the Family Court, Jind, rejected on December 2, 2024. This rejection led to the instant revision petition.
Legal Framework and Arguments
The crux of the dispute revolved around Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (HMGA), which states:
“The natural guardian of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minor’s person… are—(a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl—the father, and after him, the mother: provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother.”
Preety’s counsel leaned heavily on this proviso, arguing that Aadhish, aged 3.5 years, should be with his mother, as supported by precedents like Roxann Sharma v. Arun Sharma (2015) 8 SCC 318, where the Supreme Court emphasized maternal custody for children under five unless compelling reasons suggest otherwise. Additional judgments cited included Pushpa Singh v. Inderjit Singh (1990) Supp SCC 53 and Mukul Chauhan v. Neha Aggarwal (2019) 4 RCR (Civil) 342, reinforcing the welfare-centric approach favoring mothers for tender-aged children.
Sumit’s counsel countered that the 2021 agreement, formalized in the divorce petition and joint statement, bound Preety to surrender custody rights. He alleged her custody claim was a coercive tactic to extract more alimony and pointed to her alleged disruptive behavior, including attempts to forcibly take Aadhish, as noted by the Family Court.
Judicial Analysis and Reasoning
Justice Aggarwal’s judgment meticulously balanced statutory law, judicial precedents, and the unique facts of the case. While acknowledging the HMGA’s presumption favoring maternal custody, the court found this was not an “ordinary” situation warranting a mechanical application of the rule. Several factors informed this conclusion:
- Binding Nature of the Prior Agreement
The court emphasized the explicit recital in the 2021 joint statement where Preety agreed to cede custody to Sumit permanently. Dismissing her claim of being “kept in the dark,” Justice Aggarwal noted her education and presumed awareness, suggesting she knowingly consented to the arrangement. This contractual element distinguished the case from typical custody disputes. - Child’s Welfare as Paramount
Drawing from Roxann Sharma, the court reiterated that the welfare of the child overrides statutory presumptions or parental rights. Aadhish had been with Sumit for over a year, and courtroom interactions revealed the child’s strong attachment to his father. When separated from Sumit in chambers, Aadhish cried inconsolably, indicating stability in his current environment. The court reasoned that uprooting him could adversely affect his mental well-being. - Comparative Living Conditions
Sumit, working from home in digital marketing and living with his mother, offered a stable, family-oriented setting. Preety, earning Rs. 10,000 monthly from math tuitions and residing with her paternal uncle and maternal aunt, presented a less consistent support system. The court found Sumit’s household more conducive for Aadhish at this stage. - Allegations and Conduct
The Family Court’s earlier order (April 3, 2024) restrained Preety from forcibly taking custody, hinting at coercive tactics. Sumit’s unelaborated allegation of Preety’s “involvement with another girl” was noted as a concern, though not decisively weighed due to its commonality in matrimonial disputes. - Interim Nature of Relief
The court clarified that its decision pertained only to interim custody, with the main custody petition still pending before the Family Court. Preety retained visitation rights, ensuring continued access to Aadhish.
Outcome and Implications
The revision petition was dismissed, affirming Sumit’s interim custody of Aadhish. The judgment reflects a pragmatic departure from the HMGA’s maternal preference, prioritizing the child’s stability over a rigid statutory rule. By refusing to disturb the status quo, the court avoided potential trauma to Aadhish while leaving the final custody determination to the trial court.
This ruling highlights a key judicial trend: while statutes like the HMGA provide a framework, courts retain discretion to deviate when extraordinary circumstances—such as prior agreements or a child’s evident well-being—demand it. It also underscores the weight of mutual agreements in family law, even when one party later retracts consent, provided the agreement was entered knowingly.
Critical Reflection
The decision raises questions about the enforceability of custody waivers in divorce settlements, especially when one party alleges duress or misrepresentation. Preety’s claim of being misled, though dismissed, hints at potential vulnerabilities in such agreements, particularly for less assertive spouses. Additionally, the court’s reliance on Aadhish’s attachment to Sumit could be critiqued as a short-term observation, given that young children often bond with their primary caregiver, regardless of who that is.
For legal practitioners, this case serves as a reminder to meticulously document custody agreements and anticipate their binding nature in future disputes. For parents, it illustrates the enduring primacy of a child’s welfare in judicial eyes, often trumping statutory norms.
References
Statutory Provisions:
- Section 6, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.
- Section 13-B, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
- Sections 7 and 25, Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.
Judicial Precedents:
- Roxann Sharma v. Arun Sharma, (2015) 8 SCC 318
- Pushpa Singh v. Inderjit Singh, (1990) Supp SCC 53 .
- Mukul Chauhan v. Neha Aggarwal and Others, (2019) 4 RCR (Civil) 342
- Saurabh Sharma v. Nishi, (2023) 4 RCR (Civil) 586
- Shantabai Sonu Barathe v. Gautam Vishnu Shellar, (1995) 1 HLR 107 (Bombay High Court).
- Mausami Moitra Ganguli v. Jayant Ganguli, (2008) 7 SCC 673.
- Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma, (2000) 3 SCC 14.