Consent and Misconception in Rape Allegations: A Supreme Court Perspective

Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s judgment in Mahesh Damu Khare v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2024 INSC 897] delves into the complex interplay between consent, promises of marriage, and the criminality associated with allegations of rape under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Court, in quashing the FIR against the appellant, emphasized the necessity of distinguishing between consensual relationships and allegations of sexual exploitation based on promises of marriage. This decision serves as a landmark in clarifying the scope of criminal liability under Section 376 IPC in the context of prolonged consensual relationships.

Case Background

The appellant, a social worker, was accused by the complainant (Respondent No. 2) of engaging in sexual relations with her over nearly a decade under the pretext of a promise to marry her. The complainant alleged that this promise vitiated her consent, thus constituting rape. The allegations also included cheating and criminal intimidation, leading to an FIR under Sections 376, 420, 504, and 506 IPC.

The appellant contested these claims, asserting that the relationship was consensual and the allegations were filed in retaliation after he ceased providing financial support. Lower courts had dismissed the appellant’s plea for quashing the FIR, prompting the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Key Issues Examined by the Court

1. The Nature and Validity of Consent Under IPC Section 375 IPC, read with Section 90, defines consent and outlines circumstances under which it may be vitiated. Consent obtained through fear, coercion, or under a misconception of fact is not considered valid. The complainant claimed her consent was vitiated as it was given under the false promise of marriage. The Court examined whether such a promise was genuinely made and, if so, whether it was intentionally deceitful from the outset.
2. Distinction Between False Promises and Breach of Promise The judgment distinguished between a promise made without intention to marry (false promise) and a promise later breached due to unforeseen circumstances. The Court reiterated that only a false promise made with the intent to deceive could vitiate consent under Section 375 IPC.
3. Duration of the Relationship and the Allegation’s Timing The Court placed significant weight on the prolonged nature of the relationship, noting that it spanned nearly a decade without contemporaneous complaints from the complainant. This delay, combined with the absence of any evident coercion, undermined the credibility of the complainant’s claim that her consent was based solely on the appellant’s promise of marriage.

Legal Principles Affirmed

The judgment draws heavily on established precedents to affirm critical legal principles:

1. Promise and Intention • For a promise to qualify as “false” under Section 90 IPC, it must be shown that the accused never intended to fulfill it when made.
2. Consent and Misconception of Fact • Consent obtained under a misconception of fact, such as a false promise of marriage, is invalid. However, the complainant must demonstrate that the false promise directly induced the consent.
3. Delayed Allegations and Credibility • Delayed allegations weaken claims of coercion or deceit. Prolonged consensual relationships, absent evidence of immediate protest or objection, are indicative of informed consent rather than exploitation.

Key Judicial Observations

The judgment reflects a cautious and balanced approach to the interpretation of rape laws:

1. On Misconception of Fact Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh observed that a mere breach of promise cannot amount to a false promise. The Court noted that the complainant was aware of the appellant’s marital status, and her sustained relationship with him suggested informed consent rather than reliance on an eventual promise of marriage.
2. Prolonged Relationships and Consent The Court underscored the implausibility of a decade-long relationship being solely predicated on a promise of marriage. It cautioned against attributing criminality to relationships that turn sour, emphasizing the importance of contextual and temporal factors in evaluating consent.
3. Abuse of Criminal Law The Court expressed concern over the trend of invoking criminal provisions to settle personal disputes or grievances. It reiterated that criminal law should not be misused to criminalize consensual relationships or impose moral judgments on personal choices.

Conclusion and Implications

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case underscores the importance of distinguishing consensual relationships from exploitative ones, particularly in the context of promises of marriage. By quashing the FIR, the Court emphasized that:

• Consent is valid when informed and voluntary, even in relationships outside traditional norms.
• Criminality cannot be imputed based on delayed allegations without clear evidence of coercion or deceit.
• Prolonged consensual relationships must be carefully scrutinized to prevent the misuse of stringent criminal provisions.

This judgment sets a significant precedent in safeguarding individual rights while ensuring that the criminal justice system is not weaponized to settle personal grievances. It reflects the judiciary’s commitment to balancing societal justice with individual freedoms in complex human relationships.

References

1. Mahesh Damu Khare v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., [2024 INSC 897].
2. Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675.
3. Sonu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 18 SCC 517.
4. R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866.
5. State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
6. Niam Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89.