Paramount or predominant objects and purposes must prevail

In State of Karnataka v. Union of India and another [1978] Beg, C.J. posed the question with regard to understanding of special rules relating to the construction of Constitution in general or of our Constitution in particular. In that context, the learned Chief Justice spoke thus:-

“83. A written Constitution, like any other enactment, is embodied in a document. There are certain general rules of interpretation and construction of all documents which, no doubt, apply to the Constitution as well.

Nevertheless, the nature of a Constitution of a sovereign Republic, which is meant to endure and stand the test of time, the strains and stresses of changing circumstances, to govern the exercise of all governmental powers, continuously, and to determine the destiny of a nation, could be said to require a special approach so that judicial intervention does not unduly thwart the march of the nation towards the goals it has set before itself.

Although, a written Constitution, which is always embodied in a document, must necessarily be subject to the basic canons of construction of documents, yet, its very nature as the embodiment of the fundamental law of the land, which has to be adapted to the changing needs of a nation, makes it imperative for Courts to determine the meanings of its parts in keeping with its broad and basic purposes and objectives.

This approach seems to flow from what may be called a basic principle of construction of documents of this type; that the paramount or predominant objects and purposes, evident from the contents, must prevail over lesser ones obscurely embedded here and there. The Constitutional document, in other words, must be read as a whole and construed in keeping with its declared objects and its functions. The dynamic needs of the nation, which a Constitution must fulfil, leave no room for merely pedantic hair-splitting play with words or semantic quibblings.

This, however, does not mean that the Courts, acting under the guise of a judicial power, which certainly extends to even making the Constitution, in the sense that they may supplement it in those parts of it where the letter of the Constitution is silent or may leave room for its development by either ordinary legislation or judicial interpretation, can actually nullify, defeat, or distort the reasonably clear meaning of any part of the Constitution in order to give expression to some theories of their own about the broad or basic scheme of the Constitution.

The theory behind the Constitution which can be taken into account for purposes of interpretation, by going even so far as to fill what have been called the “interstices” or spaces left unfilled, due perhaps to some deliberate vagueness or indefiniteness in the letter of the Constitution, must itself be gathered from express provisions of the Constitution. The dubiousness of expressions used may be cured by Courts by making their meanings clear and definite if necessary in the light of the broad and basic purposes set before themselves by the Constitution-makers.

And, these meanings may, in keeping with the objectives or ends which the Constitution of every nation must serve, change with changing requirements of the times. The power of judicial interpretation, even if it includes what, may be termed as “intersticial” law making, cannot extend to direct conflict with express provisions of the Constitution or to ruling them out of existence.”

Interpretative process cannot be in direct conflict with the express provision of the Constitution

The aforesaid paragraphs clearly convey that judicial interpretation cannot nullify, defeat or distort a constitutional provision or the interpretative process cannot be in direct conflict with the express provision of the Constitution. However, the learned Chief Justice has observed that constitutional document has to be read a whole and construed keeping in view the declared objects and functions.

In the said judgment, a distinction has been drawn between “the constitutional law” or “the fundamental law” and other laws which may be important to constitutional matters, which is appropriate to reproduce the said passage:-

“… The “fundamental distinction” between “the constitutional law” or “the fundamental law” and the ordinary laws, referred to there, was meant to bring out only this difference in the uses made of laws which, being “fundamental”, can test the validity of all other laws on a lower normative level and these other laws which are so tested. In that very special or restricted sense, the law not found in “the Constitution” could not be “constitutional,” or “fundamental” law… .”

In S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab and others [2001], a three-Judge Bench while dwelling upon the manner in which the constitutional provisions are to be interpreted had observed thus:-

“Constitutional provisions are required to be understood and interpreted with an object-oriented approach. A Constitution must not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense. The words used may be general in terms but, their full import and true meaning, has to be appreciated considering the true context in which the same are used and the purpose which they seek to achieve.”

And, again:-

“It is a settled position that debates in the Constituent Assembly may be relied upon as an aid to interpret a constitutional provision because it is the function of the court to find out the intention of the framers of the Constitution. We must remember that a Constitution is not just a document in solemn form, but a living framework for the Government of the people exhibiting a sufficient degree of cohesion and its successful working depends upon the democratic spirit underlying it being respected in letter and in spirit…”

In this regard, it apt to reproduce a passage from the Constitution Bench decision in M. Nagaraj and others v. Union of India and others[2006] :-

“The Constitution is not an ephemeral legal document embodying a set of legal rules for the passing hour. It sets out principles for an expanding future and is intended to endure for ages to come and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. Therefore, a purposive rather than a strict literal approach to the interpretation should be adopted.

A constitutional provision must be construed not in a narrow and constricted sense but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and purposes so that a constitutional provision does not get fossilised but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and challenges.”

The aforesaid pronouncements laid down the guidelines for understanding the text, context, the words and the purpose of a constitutional provision. Emphasis is on flexibility, adaptability and durability, and also not to import or implant an interpretation which would be in conflict with the express language of the Constitution.

Reference

Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016)