Chapter XV
Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with complaints made to Magistrates.
Section 200 which appears in the said Chapter inter alia provides that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and signed by the complainant and the witnesses, as also the Magistrate.
An exception to that general rule is, however, made in terms of the proviso to Section 200 in cases where the complaint is made by a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties, or where a Court has made the complaint, or the Magistrate makes over the case for enquiry or trial by another Magistrate under Section 192 of the Cr.P.C.
Section 201 deals with the procedure which a Magistrate not competent to take cognizance of the case is required to follow. Section 202 empowers the Magistrate to postpone the issue of process against the accused either to inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.
Sub-section (2) of Section 202 empowers the Magistrate to take evidence of witnesses on oath in an inquiry under sub-section (1) thereof.
Section 203, which is the only other provision appearing in Chapter XV, empowers the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint if he is of the opinion that no sufficient ground for proceeding with the same is made out.
Chapter XIX
Chapter XIX of the Code regulates trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. While Part A of that Chapter deals with cases instituted on a police report, Part B deals with cases instituted otherwise than on a police report.
Section 244 that appears in Part B of Chapter XIX requires the Magistrate to “proceed to hear the prosecution” and “take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution” once the accused appears or is brought before him.
Section 245 empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused upon taking all the evidence referred to in Section 244, if he considers that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction. Sub-section (2) of Section 245 empowers the Magistrate to discharge an accused even “at any previous stage” if for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate the charges are considered to be “groundless”.
In cases where the accused is not discharged, the Magistrate is required to follow the procedure under Section 246 of the Code. That provision may at this stage be extracted:
“246. Procedure where accused is not discharged –
(1) If, when such evidence has been taken, or at any previous stage of the case, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.
(2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make.
(3) If the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate shall record the plea, and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon.
(4) If the accused refuses to plead, or does not plead or claims to be tried or if the accused is not convicted under sub-section (3), he shall be required to state, at the commencement of the next hearing of the case, or, if the Magistrate for reasons to be recorded in writing so thinks fit, forthwith, whether he wishes to cross-examine any, and, if so, which, of the witnesses for the prosecution whose evidence has been taken.
(5) If he says he does so wish, the witnesses named by him shall be recalled and, after cross-examination and re-examination (if any), they shall be discharged.
(6) The evidence of any remaining witnesses for the prosecution shall next be taken, and after cross-examination and re- examination (if any), they shall also be discharged.”
A simple reading of the above would show that the Magistrate is required to frame in writing a charge against the accused “when such evidence has been taken” and there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter which such Magistrate is competent to try and adequately punish.
Sections 244 to 246 leave no manner of doubt that once the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate the prosecution has to be heard and all such evidence as is brought in support of its case recorded. The power to discharge is also under Section 245 exercisable only upon taking all of the evidence that is referred to in Section 244, so also the power to frame charges in terms of Section 246 has to be exercised on the basis of the evidence recorded under Section 244.
The expression “when such evidence has been taken” appearing in Section 246 is significant and refers to the evidence that the prosecution is required to produce in terms of Section 244(1) of the Code.
Difference
There is nothing either in the provisions of Sections 244, 245 and 246 or any other provision of the Code for that matter to even remotely suggest that evidence which the Magistrate may have recorded at the stage of taking of cognizance and issuing of process against the accused under Chapter XV tantamounts to evidence that can be used by the Magistrate for purposes of framing of charges against the accused persons under Section 246 thereof without the same being produced under Section 244 of the Code.
The scheme of the two Chapters is totally different. While Chapter XV deals with the filing of complaints, examination of the complainant and the witnesses and taking of cognizance on the basis thereof with or without investigation and inquiry, Chapter XIX Part B deals with trial of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report.
The trial of an accused under Chapter XIX and the evidence relevant to the same has no nexus proximate or otherwise with the evidence adduced at the initial stage where the Magistrate records depositions and examines the evidence for purposes of deciding whether a case for proceeding further has been made out.
All that may be said is that evidence that was adduced before a Magistrate at the stage of taking cognizance and summoning of the accused may often be the same as is adduced before the Court once the accused appears pursuant to the summons. There is, however, a qualitative difference between the approach that the Court adopts and the evidence adduced at the stage of taking cognizance and summoning the accused and that recorded at the trial.
The difference lies in the fact that while the former is a process that is conducted in the absence of the accused, the latter is undertaken in his presence with an opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the prosecution.
The whole object underlying recording of evidence under Section 244 after the accused has appeared is to ensure that not only does the accused have the opportunity to hear the evidence adduced against him, but also to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses with a view to showing that the witness is either unreliable or that a statement made by him does not have any evidentiary value or that it does not incriminate him.
Section 245 of the Code, as noticed earlier, empowers the Magistrate to discharge the accused if, upon taking of all the evidence referred to in Section 244, he considers that no case against the accused has been made out which may warrant his conviction.
Whether or not a case is made out against him, can be decided only when the accused is allowed to cross- examine the witnesses for otherwise he may not be in a position to demonstrate that no case is made out against him and thereby claim a discharge under Section 245 of the Code.
It is elementary that the ultimate quest in any judicial determination is to arrive at the truth, which is not possible unless the deposition of witnesses goes through the fire of cross-examination. In a criminal case, using a statement of a witness at the trial, without affording to the accused an opportunity to cross-examine, is tantamount to condemning him unheard.
Life and liberty of an individual recognised as the most valuable rights cannot be jeopardised leave alone taken away without conceding to the accused the right to question those deposing against him from the witness box.
Reference
Sunil Mehta vs State Of Gujarat (2013)