An excerpt from the Judgment (Headings have been added)

A. K. Gopalan’s Case (1950)

The view taken by the majority in A. K. Gopalan’s case (1950) was that so long as a law of preventive detention satisfies the requirements of Article 22, it would be within the terms of Article 21 and it would not be required to meet the challenge of Article 19.

This view proceeded on the assumption that “certain articles in the constitution exclusively deal with specific matters” and where the requirements of an article dealing with the particular matter in question are satisfied and there is no infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by that article, no recourse can be had to a fundamental right conferred by another article.

Challenge to the Doctrine of Exclusivity: R. C. Cooper’s Case (1970)

This doctrine of exclusivity was seriously questioned in R. C. Cooper’s case (1970) and it was over-ruled by a majority of the Full Court, only Ray, J., as he then was, dissenting.

The majority judges held that though a law of preventive detention may pass the test of Article 22, it has yet to satisfy the requirements of other fundamental rights such as Article 19. The ratio of the majority judgment in R. C. Cooper’s case was explained in clear and categorical terms by Shelat, J., speaking on behalf of seven judges of the Court in Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal (1973). The learned Judge there said:

“In Gopalan’s case (supra) the majority court had held that Article 22 was a self-contained Code and therefore a law of preventive detention did not have to satisfy the requirement of Articles 19, 14 and 21. The view of Fazal Ali, J., on the other hand, was that preventive detention was a direct breach of the right under Article 19 (1) (d) and that a law providing for preventive detention had to be subject to such judicial review as is obtained under clause (5) of that Article.

In R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, (supra) the aforesaid premise, of the majority in Gopalan’s case (supra) was disapproved and therefore it no longer holds the field. Though Cooper’s case (supra) dealt with the inter-relationship of Article 19 and Article 31, the basic approach to construing the fundamental rights guaranteed in the different provisions of the Constitution adopted in this case held the major premise of the majority in Gopalan’s case (supra) to be incorrect.”

Subsequent Cases Affirming Ruling

Subsequently, in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (1975) also, a Bench of five Judges of the Court, after referring to the decisions in A. K. Gopalan’s case and R. C. Cooper’s case, agreed that the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, which is a law of preventive detention, has to be tested in regard to its reasonableness with reference to Article 19.

That decision accepted and applied the ratio in R. C. Cooper’s case and Shambhu Nath Sarkar’s case and proceeded to consider the challenge of Article 19 to the constitutional validity of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 and held that the Act did not violate any of the constitutional guarantees enshrined in Art. 19.

The same view was affirmed once again by a Bench of four judges of Supreme Court in Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.(1975) Interestingly, even prior to these decisions, as pointed out by Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, in his book “The Supreme Court of India” at page 235, reference was made, by Supreme Court in Mohd. Sabir v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1971) to article 19(2) to justify preventive detention.

The law, must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and that even if there is a law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of ‘personal liberty’ and there is consequently no infringement of the fundamental right conferred by Article 21, such law, in so far as it abridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that article.

This proposition can no longer be disputed after the decisions in R. C. Cooper’s case, Shambhu Nath Sarkar’s case and Haradhan Saha’s case. Now, if a law depriving a person of ‘personal liberty’ and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of Article 21 has to stand the test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation, ex hypothesi it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14.

Reference

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)