The Indian Penal Code excepts from the operation of its penal clauses large classes of acts done in good faith for the purpose of repelling unlawful aggression but this right has been regulated and circumscribed by several principles and limitations. The most salient of them concerned the defence of body are as under-

Firstly, there is no right of private defence against an act which is not in itself an offence under the Code;

Secondly, the right commences as soon as and not before a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit some offence although the offence may not have been committed and it is conterminous with the duration of such apprehension (Section 102). That is to say, right avails only against a danger imminent, present and real;

Thirdly, it is a defensive and not & punitive or retributive right. Consequently, in no case the right extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of the defence. (Section 99).

In other words, the injury which is inflicted by the person exercising the right should be commensurate with the injury with which he is threatened. At the same time, it is difficult to expect from a person exercising this right in good faith, to weigh “with golden scales” what maximum amount of force is necessary to keep within the right. Every reasonable allowance should be made for the bona fide defender “if he with the instinct of self-preservation strong upon him, pursues his defence a little further than may be strictly necessary in the circumstances to avert the attack.”

It would be wholly unrealistic to expect of a person under assault, to modulate his defence step by step according to the attack;

Fourthly, the right extends to the killing of the actual or potential assailant when there is a reasonable and imminent apprehension of the atrocious crimes enumerated in the six clauses of Section 100.

In other words, a person who is in imminent and reasonable danger of losing his life or limb may in the exercise of right of self-defence inflict any harm, even extending to death on his assailant either when the assault is attempted or directly threatened. This principle is also subject to the preceding rule that the harm or death inflicted to avert the danger is not substantially disproportionate to and incommensurate with the quality and character of the perilous act or threat intended to be repelled;

Fifthly, there must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by retreat, for the person confronted with an impending peril to life or of grave bodily harm, except by inflicting death on the assailant;

Sixthly; the right being, in essence, a defensive right, does not accrue and avail where there is “time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities.” (Section 99).

Section 105 of the Evidence Act

Section 105, Evidence Act enacts an exception to the general rule whereby in a criminal trial the burden of proving everything necessary to establish the charge against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, rests on the prosecution.

According to the section, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code; or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the Code or in any other Law, shall be on the accused person, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. But this Section does not neutralize or shift the general burden that lies on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the ingredients of the offence with which the accused stand charged.

Therefore, where the charge about the accused is one of culpable homicide, the prosecution must prove beyond all manner of reasonable doubt that the accused caused the death with the requisite knowledge or intention described in Section 299 of the Penal Code. It is only after the prosecution so discharges its initial traditional burden establishing the complicity of the accused, that the question whether or not the accused had acted in the exercise of his right of private defence, arises.

As pointed out by the Court in Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat , under Section 105, read with the definition of “shall presume” in Section 5, Evidence Act, the Court shall regard the absence of circumstances on the basis of which the benefit of an Exception (such as the one on which right of private defence is claimed), as proved unless, after considering the matters before it, it believes that the said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did exist.

The accused has to rebut the presumption envisaged in the last limb of Section 105, by bringing on record evidential material before the Court sufficient for a prudent man to believe that the existence of such circumstances is probable.

In other words, even under Section 105, the standard of proof required to establish those circumstances is that of a prudent man as laid down in Section 3, Evidence Act. But within that standard there are degrees of probability, and that is why under Section 105, the nature of burden on an accused person claiming the benefit of an Exception, is not as onerous as the general burden of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt cast on the prosecution. The accused may discharge his burden by establishing a mere balance of probabilities in his favour with regard to the said circumstances.

The material before the Court to establish such a preponderance of probability in favour of the defence plea may consist of oral or documentary evidence, admissions appearing in evidence led by the prosecution or elicited from prosecution witnesses in cross-examination presumptions, and the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC, 1973.

Notwithstanding the failure of the accused to establish positively the existence of circumstances which would bring his case within an Exception, the circumstances proved by him may raise a reasonable doubt with regard to one or more of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself with which the accused stands charged.

Thus, there may be cases where, despite the failure of the accused to discharge his burden under Section 105, the material brought on the record may, in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, be enough to induce in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt with regard to the mens rea requisite for an offence under Section 299 of the Code.

Reference

Yogendra Morarji vs State Of Gujarat; 1980 CriLJ 459, (1980) 2 SCC 218