Article 105 which is located in Part V Chapter II of the Constitution stipulates the powers, privileges, and immunities of Parliament, its members and committees. An analogous provision concerning State Legislatures is in Article 194 of the Constitution. Article 105 reads as follows:

105. Powers, privileges, etc., of the Houses of Parliament and of the members and committees thereof.

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom of speech in Parliament.

(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.

(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.

(4) The provisions of clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of, a House of Parliament or any committee thereof as they apply in relation to members of Parliament.”

Article 105 of the Constitution has four clauses. Clause (1) declares that there shall be freedom of speech in Parliament. This freedom is subject to the Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure in Parliament. Therefore, the freedom of speech in Parliament would be subject to the provisions that regulate its procedure framed under Article 118.

It is also subject to Article 121 which restricts Parliament from discussing the conduct of any Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court in the discharge of their duties except upon a motion for presenting an address to the President praying for the removal of the Judge. The freedom of speech guaranteed in Parliament under Article 105(1) is distinct from that guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).

In Alagaapuram R Mohanraj v. TN Legislative Assembly[1] Supreme Courtdelineated the differences in these freedoms as follows:

a. While the fundamental right of speech guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) inheres in every citizen, the freedom of speech contemplated under Articles 105 and 194 is not available to every citizen but only to a member of the legislature;

b. Article 105 is available only during the tenure of the membership of those bodies. On the other hand, the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) is inalienable;

c. Article 105 is limited to the premises of the legislative bodies. Article 19(1)(a) has no such geographical limitations; and

d. Article 19(1)(a) is subject to reasonable restrictions which are compliant with Article 19(2).

However, the right of free speech available to a legislator under Articles 105 or 194 is not subject to such limitations. That an express provision is made for freedom of speech in Parliament in clause (1) of Article 105 suggests that this freedom is independent of the freedom of speech conferred by Article 19 and is not restricted by the exceptions contained therein.

Clause (2) of Article 105 has two limbs. The first prescribes that a member of Parliament shall not be liable before any court in respect of “anything said or any vote given” by them in Parliament or any committee thereof. The second limb prescribes that no person shall be liable before any court in respect of the publication by or under the authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, vote or proceedings. The vote given by a member of Parliament is an extension of speech.

Therefore, the freedom of a member of Parliament to cast a vote is also protected by the freedom of speech in Parliament. In Tej Kiran Jain v. N Sanjeeva Reddy,[2] a six-judge bench of Supreme Court held that Article 105(2) confers immunity in respect of “anything said” so long as it is “in Parliament.” Therefore, the immunity is qualified by the fact that it must be attracted to speech during the conduct of business in Parliament. Supreme Court held that the word “anything” is of the widest import and is equivalent to “everything”. It is only limited by the term “in Parliament”.

Clauses (1) and (2) explicitly guarantee freedom of speech in Parliament. Clause (1) is a positive postulate which guarantees freedom of speech whereas Clause (2) is an extension of the same freedom postulated negatively. It does so by protecting the speech, and by extension a vote, from proceedings before a court. Freedom of speech in the Houses of Parliament and their committees is a necessary privilege, essential to the functioning of the House.

The privilege of free speech in the House of Parliament or Legislature can be traced to the struggle of the Indian legislators and was granted in progression by the colonial government. This privilege is not only essential to the ability of Parliament and its members to carry out their duties, but it is also at the core of the function of a democratic legislative institution. Members of Parliament and Legislatures represent the will of the people and their aspirations.

The Constitution was adopted to have a modernizing influence. The Constitution is intended to meet the aspirations of the people, to eschew an unjust society premised on social hierarchies and discrimination, and to facilitate the path towards an egalitarian society.

Freedom of speech in Parliament and the legislatures is an arm of the same aspiration so that members may express the grievances of their constituents, express diverse perspectives and ventilate the perspectives of their constituents. Freedom of speech in Parliament ensures that the government is held accountable by the House.

In Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India (2018) Supreme Court had occasion to elucidate the importance of this privilege:

“181. […] Parliament represents collectively, through the representative character of its Members, the voice and aspirations of the people. Free speech within Parliament is crucial for democratic governance. It is through the fearless expression of their views that Parliamentarians pursue their commitment to those who elect them.

The power of speech exacts democratic accountability from elected governments. The free flow of dialogue ensures that in framing legislation and overseeing government policies, Parliament reflects the diverse views of the electorate which an elected institution represents.

182. The Constitution recognises free speech as a fundamental right in Article 19(1)(a). A separate articulation of that right in Article 105(1) shows how important the debates and expression of view in Parliament have been viewed by the draftspersons. Article 105(1) is not a simple reiteration or for that matter, a surplusage.

It embodies the fundamental value that the free and fearless exposition of critique in Parliament is the essence of democracy. Elected Members of Parliament represent the voices of the citizens. In giving expression to the concerns of citizens, Parliamentary speech enhances democracy. […]”

Notably, unlike the House of Commons in the UK, India does not have ‘ancient and undoubted’ rights which were vested after a struggle between Parliament and the King. On the contrary, privileges were always governed by statute in India. The statutory privilege transitioned to a constitutional privilege after the commencement of the Constitution. However, while the drafters of the Constitution expressly envisaged the freedom of speech in Parliament, they left the other privileges to be decided by Parliament through legislation.

Clause (3) of Article 105 states that in respect of privileges not falling under Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 105, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law. Until Parliament defines these privileges, they are to be those which the House and its members and committees enjoyed immediately before the coming into force of Section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.

Section 15 reads as follows:

“15. Amendment of article 105.-In article 105 of the Constitution, in clause (3), for the words “shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution”, the words, figures and brackets “shall be those of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978” shall be substituted.”

The privileges enjoyed by the House and its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of Section 15 of the Forty-fourth amendment to the Constitution were those enjoyed by the House of Commons in the UK at the commencement of the Constitution of India. This was also the case with Clause (3) of Article 194 which was amended by Section 26 of the Forty-fourth amendment to the Constitution.

The reference to the House of Commons was accepted by the Constituent Assembly for two reasons. First, Indian legislators did not enjoy any privilege prior to the commencement of the Constitution and therefore a reference to the Dominion Parliament would leave the House with virtually no privileges. Second, it was not possible to make an exhaustive list of privileges at the time nor was it preferable to enlist such a long list as a schedule to the Constitution.

Clause (3) allows Parliament to enact a law on its privileges from time to time. It may be noted here that the House of Commons in the UK does not create new privileges.43 Its privileges are those which have been practiced by the House and have become ancient and undoubted.

Further, unlike the House of Commons in the UK, Parliament in India cannot claim power of its own composition. The extent of privileges in India has to be within the confines of the Constitution. Within this scheme, the Courts have jurisdiction to determine whether the privilege claimed by the House of Parliament or Legislature in fact exists and whether they have been exercised correctly.

In a steady line of precedent, Supreme Court has held that in the absence of legislation on privileges, the Parliament or Legislature may only claim such privilege which belonged to the House of Commons at the time of the commencement of the Constitution and that the House is not the sole judge to decide its own privilege.

When the Parliament or Legislatures enact a law on privileges, such a law would be subject to the scrutiny of Part III of the Constitution. The interplay between Part III of the Constitution and Article 105(3) arose in the decision of Supreme Court in MSM Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha,[3] where a Constitution bench speaking through SR Das, CJ held that the privileges of the House of Parliament under Clause (3) of Article 105 are those which belonged to the House of Commons in the UK at the commencement of the Constitution which would prevail over the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

However, if the Parliament were to enact a law codifying its privilege then it may not step over the fundamental rights of citizens by virtue of Article 13 of the Constitution. K Subba Rao, J (as the learned Chief Justice then was) dissented from the majority and held that the import of privileges held by the House of Commons in the UK was only a transitory provision till the Parliament or legislatures enact a law codifying their respective privileges. Therefore, Justice Subba Rao held in his dissent that the legislature cannot run roughshod over the fundamental rights of citizens who in theory have retained their rights and only given a part of it to the legislature.

In Special Reference No. 1 of 1964,[4] a seven-judge Bench of Supreme Court opined on the privileges of the State Legislature upon a Presidential reference. The reference was in the aftermath of the Speaker of the UP Legislative Assembly directing the arrest and production of two judges of the High Court. The two judges had interfered with a resolution to administer reprimand to a person who had published a pamphlet libelling one of the members of the Assembly.

Gajendragadkar, CJ speaking for the majority did not disagree with the decision in MSM Sharma (supra) which held that Article 105(3) and Article 194(3) would prevail over Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. However, the Court held that Article 21 was to prevail over Articles 105(3) and 194(3) in a conflict between the two.

The Court held that the Parliament or Legislature is not the sole judge of its privileges and the courts have the power to enquire if a particular privilege claimed by the legislature in fact existed or not, by consulting the privileges of the Commons. The determination of privileges, the Court held, and whether they conform to the parameters of the Constitution is a question that must be answered by the courts. Supreme Court opined that:

“37. The next question which faces us arises from the preliminary contention raised by Mr Seervai that by his appearance before us on behalf of the House, the House should not be taken to have conceded to the Court the jurisdiction to construe Article 194(3) so as to bind it. As we have already indicated, his stand is that in the matter of privileges, the House is the sole and exclusive judge at all stages. […] …

42. In coming to the conclusion that the content of Article 194(3) must ultimately be determined by courts and not by the legislatures, we are not unmindful of the grandeur and majesty of the task which has been assigned to the legislatures under the Constitution. Speaking broadly, all the legislative chambers in our country today are playing a significant role in the pursuit of the ideal of a Welfare State which has been placed by the Constitution before our country, and that naturally gives the legislative chambers a high place in the making of history today. […]”

The opinion in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (supra) was further affirmed by another seven-judge bench of Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Union of India[5] which held that whenever a question arises whether the House has jurisdiction over a matter under its privileges, the adjudication of such a claim is vested exclusively in the courts. Relying on Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (supra) and State of Karnataka (supra) a Constitution bench of Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2016) held that the court has the authority and jurisdiction to examine if a privilege asserted by the House (or even a member by extension) in fact accrues under the Constitution.

Further, in Amarinder Singh v. Punjab Vidhan Sabha (2010) a Constitution bench of Supreme Court held that the courts are empowered to scrutinise the exercise of privileges by the House.[6] The interplay between fundamental rights of citizens and the privileges of the Houses of Parliament or Legislature is pending before a Constitution bench of Supreme Court in N Ravi v. Speaker, Legislative Assembly Chennai.[7]

Clause (4) of Article 105 extends the freedoms in the above clauses to all persons who by virtue of the Constitution have a right to speak in Parliament. The four clauses in Articles 105 and 194 form a composite whole which lend colour to each other and together form the corpus of the powers, privileges and immunities of the Houses of Parliament or Legislature, as the case may be, and of members and committees.

It has been a timeless insistence of the legislators that their freedom of speech to carry out their essential legislative functions be protected and sanctified. Whereas the drafters of our Constitution have expressly guaranteed the freedom of speech in Parliament and legislature, they left the other privileges uncodified.

In a consistent line of precedent Supreme Court has held that –

Firstly, Parliament or the state legislature is not the sole judge of what privileges it enjoys and

Secondly, Parliament or legislature may only claim privileges which are essential and necessary for the functioning of the House.


[1] (2016) 6 SCC 82

[2] (1970) 2 SCC 272

[3] AIR 1959 SC 395

[4] 1964 SCC OnLine SC 21.

[5] (1977) 4 SCC 608, para 63.

[6] (2010) 6 SCC 113, para 54

[7] WP (Crl) No. 206-210/2003 etc