Accession of Jammu and Kashmir

The British Parliament enacted the Indian Independence Act 1947. In terms of Section 1(1) of the Act, two independent Dominions – India and Pakistan were to be established from 15 August 1947. Section 7(1)(b) stipulated that following independence, the sovereignty of the British monarch over Indian States would lapse and return to the Rulers of those States.

Consequently, as sovereign States, 562 Princely States had the choice to remain independent or to accede to either of the two Dominions established by the Act. Section 8 enunciated that as a transitional measure, the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 would continue to apply to the two Dominions subject to conditions.

In pursuance of the provisions of Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act 1947, the Governor-General of India issued the India (Provisional Constitution) Order 1947 which made certain provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 applicable to India until other provisions were made applicable by the Constituent Assembly. Section 6 of the Government of India Act 1935 became applicable through the Order which dealt with the accession of Princely States to India through the execution of IoA.

Nehru’s letter to Patel

Jammu and Kashmir had not executed an IoA when India had attained independence. Soon after which on 27 September 1947, a letter was addressed by Nehru to Sardar Patel noting that he had received many reports of a dangerous and deteriorating situation in Kashmir. Nehru stated that with the onset of the winter, Kashmir would be cut-off from the rest of India. Nehru stated that “the Muslim League in the Punjab and the NWFP are making preparations to enter Kashmir in considerable numbers”, stating further that:

 “I understand that the Pakistan strategy is to infiltrate into Kashmir now and to take some big action as soon as Kashmir is more or less isolated because of the coming winter.”

Watch: Jawaharlal Nehru and the Art of Letter Writing

The letter stated that once the State acceded to India, it would become difficult for Pakistan to invade it officially or unofficially without coming into conflict with the Indian Union. If, however, there was to be delay in accession, Pakistan would go ahead without much fear of consequences “specially when the winter isolates Kashmir”. Nehru concluded his letter stating:

“I would again add that time is [of] the essence of the business and things must be done in a way so as to bring about the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union as rapidly as possible with the co-operation of Sheikh Abdullah.”

Maharaja Hari Singh’s communication to Lord Mountbatten

On 26 October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh addressed a communication to Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General noting that “a grave emergency has arisen” in his State leading him to “request immediate assistance” of the Government. The letter noted that the Maharaja had “wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion” he should accede or whether it would be in the best interest of both the Dominions as well as Jammu and Kashmir for the State to “stand independent”.

The Maharaja stated that while Pakistan had, responding to his request, entered into a Standstill Agreement with the State, the Dominion of India desired further discussion which could not be arranged by him in view of the grave developments which took place as elucidated in his letter. The Pakistan government, he noted, “permitted steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol” to Jammu and Kashmir in spite of the Standstill Agreement.

The letter of the Maharaja spoke of the grave danger to the security and existence of Jammu and Kashmir occasioned by the infiltration of soldiers in plain clothes who were threatening to capture Srinagar. The letter contains a statement of the position which the State of Jammu and Kashmir was confronted with, in the following extracts:

“Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern weapons have been allowed to infliter into the State at first in Poonch and then in Sialkot and finally in mass area adjoining Hazara District on the Ramkot side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at the several points simultaneously, that it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and looting.

The Mohara power-house which supplies the electric current to the whole of Srinagar has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnapped and raped and makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer Capital of my Government, as first step to over running the whole State.

The mass infiltration tribesman drawn from the distant areas of the North-West Frontier coming regularly in motor trucks using Mansehra-Muzaffarabad Road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons cannot possibly be done without the knowing of the Provincial Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of Pakistan.

In spite of repeated requests made by my Government no attempt has been made to check these raiders or stop them from coming to my State. The Pakistan Radio even put out a story that a Provisional Government has been set up in Kashmir.”

The Maharaja sought help and recognised that India would be able to lend assistance only if the State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India:

“I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and my people to free-booters. On this basis no civilized Government can exist or be maintained. The alternative I will never allow to happen as long as I am Ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country.”

The offer of accession noted that if the State of Jammu and Kashmir “has to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar”. The letter proposed the setting up of an interim government with Sheikh Abdullah being asked to carry out the responsibilities as Prime Minister “in this emergency”.

Signing of Instrument of Accession

Maharaja Hari Singh signed the IoA on 26 October 1947. The Instrument was accepted by the Governor-General on 27 October 1947. In his communication dated 27 October 1947 to the Maharaja, the Governor-General noted that “in the special circumstances mentioned by your Highness, my Government has decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India”.

The letter of the Governor General also noted that the policy of their Government was that in case of any State where the issue of accession is a subject of dispute, “it is my Government’s wish” that the question of accession “should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State.” Thus, the letter noted that in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the question of the State’s accession must be settled with reference to the people of the State:

“[…] my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistently with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government’s wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.”

The Account of J&K Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan

Shri Mehr Chand Mahajan (later a judge of the Supreme Court and Chief Justice of India) had taken over as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir on 15 October 1947. His Memoirs titled “Looking Back” devote an entire Chapter to the “Pak invasion of Kashmir”. Mehr Chand Mahajan provides a detailed account of the events commencing from 23 October 1947. The account can best be captured in his own words in the following extracts:

“… Meanwhile the tribesmen from the frontier using Pakistan lorries, jeeps and other conveyances and armed with Pakistani weapons had entered the State on 23 October through Muzaffarabad. These tribesmen were themselves Pakistan nationals; as they advanced they were joined by other Pakistani citizens. The rail had been organised by an ex-officer of the Political Agency at Peshawar, at the instance and with the connivance of the Pakistan government.

Transport, arms, ammunition and military officers were supplied by the Pakistan Government. We had tried to blow the bridge that could provide – and did provide – access to the tribesmen into Kashmir. But as related earlier, this attempt had failed for want of dynamite in the State. Now they pushed on. At Domel the Muslim officers and soldiers of the State forces who had been guarding this frontier under Col. Narain Singh deserted and joined the raiders after killing their commander in his officer at the Domel dak bungalow.

Flushed with arson, loot, and murder, the tribesmen now pushed on the way to Srinagar. At Garhi, the Chief of the Dogra Army staff with his small force tried to stop their advance. He held them up for sometime but ultimately fell against enormously superior forces.

October 24th was the Dussehra Darbar Day on which every year the Maharaja took the salute from the army and held a Darbar. A discussion took place in the palace on the 23rd night whether or not the Darbar should be held in view of the situation that had arisen. The Maharaja was of the opinion that the Darbar should not be held as enough State forces for the ceremonial parade were not available.

All that had been left of the army in Srinagar was about four companies of the cavalry. I advised otherwise, being of the opinion that cancellation of the Darbar would unnecessarily create panic in the town. … No sooner had we left the Darbar Hall and reached the Mirakadal Bridge, electricity failed. The city was plunged into darkness. …. I also rang up the power house at Mahoora where a chowkidar came on the line and told me that a wounded captain of the army had come on horseback saying “The raiders have come. Run away.”

This, he said, had created panic and most of the men of the power house had fled from the place. … On 24th October, the Deputy Prime Minister left Srinagar for Delhi carrying a letter of accession to India-from the Maharaja and a personal letter to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and another to Sardar Patel asking for military help in men, arms and ammunition. I also wrote to both requesting them to save the State from Pakistan’s unprovoked aggression. …

After assuming office on 15th October, I had sent Col. Baldev Singh Pathani and our military adviser, Col. Kashmir Singh, to Poonch and Kotli to help our small military force there, and to inspire confidence in the citizens. Col. Baldev Singh remained at Kotli to give heart to the citizens at great personal risk while col. Kashmir Singh returned to Srinagar to apprise the Maharaja about the military situation in Poonch and in Kotli.

After consulting the Officer commanding, Srinagar Forces, the Governor of Srinagar and the Inspector General of Police, we decided in the afternoon of 25th that the raiders should be given a receding battle. Every effort was to be made to secure that our depleted forces suffered as few casualties as possible. An all-out effort was to be made to check the advance of the raiders to the town of Srinagar.

As we were groping for a way out, Mr V.P. Menon, Secretary of the Ministry of States, arrived in Srinagar by plane. He came straight to my residence to see me and told me that he had come there to take me to New Delhi. … After His Highness left at 2 A.M. an officer came from the front and informed me that the Dogra Chief of Staff had been wounded and was lying on the road with six or seven bullets in his body. He had ordered the rest of his troops to retreat to a position of vantage but did not wish to leave the place where he lay. Though fatally wounded, he was determined to give a fight as long as he was alive.

Next morning Mr. V. P. Menon and I flew to Delhi. We arrived at Safdarjung airport at about 8 A. M. where a car was waiting. I immediately drove to the Prime Minister’s House on Yourd Road. The Prime Minister and Sardar Patel both were there and were apprised of the situation that had arisen. In view of the advance of the raiders towards the town of Baramula and Srinagar. I requested immediate military aid on any terms.

I said somewhat emphatically that the town was taken by the tribesmen, India was strong enough to re-take it. Its recapture, however, could not have undone the damage that would have resulted. I, therefore, firmly but respectfully insisted on the acceptance of my request for immediate military aid. The Prime Minister observed that it was not easy on the spur of the moment to send troops as such an operation required considerable preparation and arrangement, the troops could not be moved without due deliberation merely on my demand.

I was, however, adamant in my submission; the Prime Minister also was sticking to his own view. As a last resort I said, “Give us the military force we need. Take the accession and give whatever power you desire to the popular party. The army must fly to save Srinagar this evening or else I will go to Lahore and negotiate terms with Mr Jinnah.”

When I told the Prime Minister of India that I had orders to go to Pakistan in case immediate military aid was not given he naturally became upset and in an angry tone said, “Mahajan, go away.” I got up and was about to leave the room when Sardar Patel detained me by saying in my ear, “Of course, Mahajan, you are not going to Pakistan.”

Just then, a piece of paper was passed over the Prime Minister, He read it and in a loud voice said, “Sheikh Sahib also says the same thing.” It appeared that Sheikh Abdulla had been listening to all this talk while sitting in one of the bedrooms adjoining the drawing room where we were. He now strengthened my hands by telling the Prime Minister that military help must be sent immediately.

… At 12.45 p. m. Sardar Baldev Singh came and told me that a decision had been taken to send two companies of Indian troops to Srinagar. All the planes in India had been requisitioned for the purpose. He also wanted me to give the commander of this force as much information as I could about the situation in the State. Luckily I had brought with me a plan which showed where the clash between the raiders and the State forces had occurred, the deployment of the raiders and distribution of the State forces. …

The Cabinet meeting in the evening affirmed the decision of the Defence Council to give military aid to the Maharaja to drive out the tribesmen. Around dinner time, the Prime Minister sent a message to me that with Mr. V. P. Menon, I should fly to Jammu to inform the Maharaja of this decision and also to get his signature on certain supplementary documents about the accession.”

In Chapter 19, titled Kashmir’s Accession to India, Mahajan notes that on 27 October 1947, he received a message that the Indian troops had landed at Srinagar and “had gone into action”

Mahajan notes that on 27 October 1947, he flew to Jammu with Mr V P Menon (the Secretary in the Ministry of States). On their landing in Srinagar, the Indian troops had gone into battle with the tribesmen. Mahajan recounts what happened thereafter:

“…After some discussion, formal documents were signed which Mr. Menon took back to New Delhi, while I stayed at Jammu. This was a narrow shave. After the failure of the Pak attempt to capture both the Maharaja and myself at Bhimber, Mr Jinnah had got impatient. He ordered his British Commander-in-Chief to move two brigades of the Pak army into Kashmir on 27 October, one form Rawalpindi and another from Sialkot. The Sialkot army was to march to Jammu, take the city and make the Maharaja a prisoner.

The Rawalpindi column was to advance to Srinagar and capture the city, all this on the excuse that the State should be saved the anarchy that the tribesmen’s raid had produced. The Maharaja having acceded just in time and the Indian Army being already in Kashmir, this could have meant pitting Pakistan forces against those of India.

Both the dominions owing allegiance to the King and the armies of both being under a Joint Defence Council, such a move, the Pak Commander-in-Chief told Mr Jinnah was unthinkable. The King as the ruler of Pakistan could not send his (Pak) armies against his own armies in India. The British Commander-in-Chief therefore, refused to issue the order and offered to resign. Mr Jinnah had to cancel his orders.”

Mahajan has stated in his Memoir that Prime Minister Nehru indicated three conditions on which the Maharaja had been given the military help. According to him:

“… Panditji write out briefly those terms. The first one was that His Highness should accede to India with regard to three subjects: defence, external affairs and transport. This he had already done. The second was that the internal administration of the State should be democratized and a new constitution be framed on the lines of the model already set out for the State of Mysore. The third condition was that Sheikh Abdulla should be taken in the administration and made responsible for it along with the Prime Minister.”

Mahajan eventually states that: “…The Indian forces suffered heavily in the first attack but after reinforcements arrived they drove out the raiders from the neighbourhood of Srinagar where they had infiltrated after looting and destroying the town of Baramulla.”

Account of V P Menon

V P Menon provides a detailed account of the events preceding the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to the Union of India in his book titled, “The Story of the Integration of the Indian States”.

Menon’s account is illuminating on the events which took place from 22 October 1947 and needs to be extracted in the entirety:

“The all-out invasion of Kashmir started on 22 October 1947. The main raiders’ column, which had approximately two hundred to three hundred lorries, and which consisted of frontier tribesmen estimated at five thousand — Afridis, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Swathis, and soldiers of the Pakistan Army ‘on leave’—led by some regular officers who knew Kashmir well advanced from Abbottabad in the N.W.F.P. along the Jhelum Valley Road.

They captured Garhi and Domel arrived at the gates of Muzaffarabad. The State battalion, consisting of Muslims and Dogras stationed at Muzaffarabad, was commanded by Lt.-Colonel Narain Singh. All the Muslims in the battalion deserted; shot the Commanding Officer and his adjutant; joined the raiders, and acted as advance-guard to the raiders’ column. It may be mentioned that only a few days before Lt.-Colonel Narain Singh had been asked by the Maharajah whether he could rely on the loyalty of the Muslim half of his battalion. He unhesitatingly answered, ‘More than on the Dogras’.

He had been in command of this battalion for some years. The raiders then marched towards Baramula along the road leading to Srinagar, their next destination being Uri. All the Muslims in the State Forces had deserted and many had joined the raiders. When Brigadier Rajinder Singh, the Chief of Staff of the State Forces, heard of the desertion of the Muslim personnel and the advance of the raiders, he gathered together approximately 150 men and moved towards Uri.

There he engaged the raiders for two days and in the rearguard action destroyed the Uri bridge. The Brigadier himself and all his men were cut to pieces in this action. But he and his colleagues will live in history like the gallant Leonidas and his 300 men who held the Persian invaders at Thermopylae. It was but appropriate that when the Maha Vir Chakra decoration was instituted, the first award should have been given (posthumously) to this heroic soldier.

The raiders continued to advance and on 24 October they captured the Mahura Power House, which supplied electricity to Srinagar. Srinagar was plunged in darkness. The raiders had announced that they would reach Srinagar on 26 October in time for the Id celebrations at the Srinagar mosque. On the evening of 24 October the Government of India received a desperate appeal for help from the Maharajah. They also received from the Supreme Commander information regarding the raiders’ advance and probable intentions. On the morning of 25 October a meeting of the Defence Committee was held, presided over by Lord Mountbatten.

This Committee considered the request of the Maharajah for arms and ammunition as also for reinforcements of troops. Lord Mountbatten emphasized that no precipitate action should be taken until the Government of India had fuller information. It was agreed that I should fly to Srinagar immediately in order to study the situation on the spot and to report to the Government of India Accompanied by Army and Air Force officers and by the late D. N. Kachru, I flew by a B.O.A. C. plane to Srinagar.

This was one of the planes which had been chartered for the evacuation of British nationals from Srinagar. When I landed at the airfield, I was oppressed by the stillness as of a graveyard all around. Over everything hung an atmosphere of impending calamity. From the aerodrome we went straight to the residence of the Prime Minister of the State. The road leading from the aerodrome to Srinagar was deserted. At some of the street corners I noticed volunteers of the National Conference with lathis who challenged passers-by; but the State police were conspicuous by their absence.

Mehr Chand Mahajan apprised us of the perilous situation and pleaded for the Government of India to come to the rescue of the State. Mahajan, who is usually self-possessed, seemed temporarily to have lost his equanimity. From his residence we both proceeded to the Maharajah’s palace. The Maharajah was completely unnerved by the turn of events and by his sense of lone helplessness. There were practically no State Forces left and the raiders had almost reached the outskirts of Baramula.

At this rate they would be in Srinagar in another day or two. It was no use harping on the past or blaming the Maharajah for his inaction. I am certain that he had never thought of the possibility of an invasion of his State by tribesmen nor of the large-scale desertions of Muslims from his army and police. By that time, Srinagar had very little contact with the mofussil areas and it was difficult to find out the real situation. The one hopeful fact was that Brigadier Rajinder Singh had promised to hold the raiders as long as possible from reaching Baramula and we knew that he would fight, if necessary, to the bitter end.

The first thing to be done was to get the Maharajah and his family out of Srinagar. The reason for this was obvious. The raiders were close to Baramula. The Maharajah was quite helpless and, if the Government of India decided not to go to his rescue, there was no doubt about the fate that would befall him and his family in Srinagar. There was also a certainty that the raiders would loot all the valuable possessions in the palace.

In these circumstances I advised him to leave immediately for Jammu and to take with him his family and his valuable possessions. After assuring myself that he would leave that night and after gathering all the information I could from people who were in a position to give it, I went to the Guest House in the early hours of the morning for a little rest. Just as I was going to sleep, Mahajan rang me up to say that there were rumours that the raiders had infiltrated into Srinagar and that it would be unsafe for us to remain any longer in the city. I could hardly believe that the raiders could have reached Srinagar, but I had to accept Mahajan’s advice. The Maharajah had taken away all the available cars and the only transport available was an old jeep.

Into this were bundled Mahajan, myself and the air crew of six or seven. When we reached the airfield, the place was filled with people, in striking contrast to its deserted appearance when I arrived there the previous evening. We left Srinagar in the first light of the morning of 26 October and immediately on my arrival in Delhi I went straight to a meeting of the Defence Committee. I reported my impressions of the situation and pointed out the supreme necessity of saving Kashmir from the raiders.

Lord Mountbatten said that it would be improper to move Indian troops into what was at the moment an independent country, as Kashmir had not yet decided to accede to either India or Pakistan. If it were true that the Maharajah was now anxious to accede to India, then Jammu and Kashmir would become part of Indian Territory. This was the only basis on which Indian troops could be sent to the rescue of the State from further pillaging by the aggressors.

He further expressed the strong opinion that, in view of the composition of the population, accession should be conditional on the will of the people being ascertained by a plebiscite after the raiders had been driven out of the State and law and order had been restored.

This was readily agreed to by Nehru and other ministers. Soon after the meeting of the Defence Committee, I flew to Jammu accompanied by Mahajan. On arrival at the palace I found it in a state of utter turmoil with valuable articles strewn all been driving all night. I woke him up and told him of what had taken place at the Defence Committee meeting.

He was ready to accede at once. He then composed a letter to the Governor-General describing the pitiable plight of the State and reiterating his request for military help. He further informed the Governor-General that it was his intention to set up an interim government at once and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with Mehr Chand Mahajan, his Prime Minister.

He concluded by saying that if the State was to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. He also signed the Intrument of Accession. Just as I was leaving, he told me that before he went to sleep, he had left instructions with his ADC that, if I came back from Delhi, he was not to be disturbed as it would mean that the Government of India had decided to come to his rescue and he should therefore be allowed to sleep in peace; but that if I failed to return, it meant that everything was lost and, in that case, his ADC was to shoot him in his sleep!

With the Instrument of Accession and the Maharajah’s letter I flew back at once to Delhi. Sardar was waiting at the aerodrome and we both went straight to a meeting of the Defence Committee which was arranged for that evening. There was a long discussion, at the end of which it was decided that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be accepted, subject to the proviso that a plebiscite would be held in the State when the law and order situation allowed. It was further decided that an infantry battalion should be flown to Srinagar the next day.

This decision had the fullest support of Sheikh Abdullah, who was in Delhi at that time and who had been pressing the Government of India on behalf of the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference for immediate help to be sent to the State to resist the tribal invasion. Even after this decision had been reached Lord Mountbatten and the three British Chiefs of Staff of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force pointed out the risks involved in the operation.

But Nehru asserted that the only alternative to sending troops would be to allow a massacre in Srinagar, which would be followed by a major communal holocaust in India. Moreover, the British residents in Srinagar would certainly be murdered by the raiders, since neither the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief nor the Supreme Commander was in a position to safeguard their lives.”

Menon adverts to the operation which took place involving the air-lifting of Indian troops into Srinagar. His account further notes:

“As there was a difference of opinion between Sardar and Nehru the matter was naturally referred to Gandhiji. That night I had a telephone call from his secretary who told me that Gandhiji wanted to see me urgently. I went to Birla House and found Nehru and Sardar conferring with Gandhiji. Gandhiji asked me what my objections were to Nehru going to Lahore. I replied that when this was mooted to me by Lord Mountbatten I was entirely opposed to the idea and I gave reasons for my stand.

While the discussions were going on we noticed that Nehru was looking flushed and tired. It was found that he was actually running a high temperature. His going to Lahore was therefore out of the question. A few days later Liaqat Ali Khan cast doubts on the genuineness of Nehru’s illness, but the truth is as I have stated. It was then decided that Lord Mountbatten should go alone.”

Maharaja Hari Singh’s Proclamation

On 5 March 1948, Maharaja Hari Singh issued a Proclamation for the establishment of a “fully democratic constitution based on adult franchise with a hereditary Ruler from my dynasty as the Constitutional Head of an Executive responsible to the legislature”. Through the Proclamation, Maharaja Hari Singh replaced the Emergency Administration by a popular interim Government pending the establishment of a fully democratic Constitution.

The Council of Ministers, in terms of paragraph 1 of the Proclamation would consist of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as the Prime Minister and other Ministers who would be appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister. Para 4 noted that:

“My Council of Ministers shall take appropriate steps, as soon as restoration of normal conditions has been completed, to convene a National Assembly based on adult suffrage, having due regard to the principle that the number of representatives from each voting area should, as far as practicable, be proportionate to the population of that area.”

The Constitution, the Proclamation noted, would provide adequate safeguards for minorities and contain appropriate provisions guaranteeing the freedom of conscience, speech and of assembly. The National Assembly, it was envisaged, would upon the completion of the work of framing the new Constitution, submit it through the Council of Ministers for the acceptance of Maharaja and anticipated the inauguration “in the near future, of a fully democratic Constitution”.


The events leading up to the accession of Jammu and Kashmir are summarised below:

a. Two independent Dominions of India and Pakistan were established on 15 August 1947 by the Indian Independence Act 1947. In terms of the provisions of the Act, sovereignty of the British Monarch over Indian States would lapse and return to the Rulers of those States. The States then had a choice to either be independent of or accede to either the Dominion of Pakistan or India;

b. The State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to the Dominion of India by executing an IoA on 26 October 1947;

c. Though the State of Jammu and Kashmir had acceded to the Dominion of India, it reserved the right to alter the terms of the arrangement in view of Clause 7 of the IoA read with Section 6(2) of the Government of India Act 1935 which was made applicable through the India (Provisional Constitution) Order 1947.

In terms of Clause 7 of the IoA, the State of Jammu and Kashmir reserved the right to alter the terms of arrangement of power between India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Clause specifically reserves the right of the State to “enter into agreement with the Government of India under any future constitution”;

d. It was not the IoA but the response of the Governor General to the offer by the State of Jammu and Kashmir which recorded that since the issue of accession was in dispute in Jammu and Kashmir, it shall be decided finally by the people; and

e. On 5 March 1948, Maharaja Hari Singh issued a Proclamation for the establishment of a Constitution for the State of Jammu and Kashmir for the governance of the State.


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