In India, the Limitation Act, 1963 sets out the maximum period within which suits, appeals, and applications must be filed before the court. Cases brought after this prescribed period are typically barred due to delay unless the court decides to condone the delay. However, it is important to note that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to writ proceedings and, therefore, does not specify a particular time limit within which a writ needs to be filed.
Similarly, though the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 specify the time limit for certain petitions that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not cover (such as Special Leave Petitions), these Rules too do not specify the limitation period for filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.
However, while such a period is not prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, or the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, a writ petition filed belatedly after a considerable delay is barred by the operation of the doctrine of laches.
Doctrine of laches
The said doctrine of laches is a common law principle disallowing a claim because it has been brought to the court after an unreasonable lapse of time. It is based on the maxim ‘vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt’, which means that the law assists those who are vigilant with their rights and not those that sleep thereupon. Hence, even in the absence of the prescription of a statutory time limit for its filing, a claim that has been filed after a significant delay can be rejected at the threshold by invoking this doctrine.
Indeed, the laches principle bears similarities to the Limitation Act, 1963, as both are founded on similar policy considerations. A claim brought after considerable delay may not be entertained because third-party rights may have been established during this time-lapse, and it would be unjust to prejudice innocent parties due to the tardiness of the claimant.
Additionally, considering a delayed claim could be unfair to the opposing party, as they may have lost access to crucial evidence needed to defend against the claim. Reopening the case after a significant delay could thus place the opposing party at a disadvantage, potentially resulting in an unjust or inaccurate outcome. Moreover, it is essential to put a time limit on proceedings to provide certainty and prevent confusion from cases being in perpetual flux. It is also important to deny a delayed claim to encourage parties to be more diligent when enforcing their rights.
While the doctrine of laches serves similar underlying purposes as the Limitation Act, 1963, it is less rigid in its application. Unlike the aforementioned Act, which prescribes specific time periods for filing claims, there is no fixed timeframe under the doctrine of laches. Instead, each case is evaluated based on its unique facts and circumstances.
In the context of writ petitions, Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand Motichand[1], held that while there is no upper or lower time limit for entertaining writ petitions, the Court shall consider whether the delay was avoidable and whether such delay affects the merits of the case.
Similarly, in Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India, it was held that the Court must consider the conduct of the parties, the change in circumstances, and the prejudice that would be caused to the other party or the general public. Hence, it is settled law that the doctrine of laches is not an inviolable legal rule but a rule of practice that must be supplemented with sound exercise of judicial discretion.
While Courts must ordinarily apply this doctrine in light of the policy reasons discussed before, the doctrine allows the Court to conduct an individualized analysis of each case and entertain claims in the competing interests of justice, even when the claim may be delayed and third-party rights may have been created.
We may, however, hasten to clarify that the doctrine of delay and laches is not to be ipso facto excluded where a breach of fundamental rights is alleged. The 5-judge benches of supreme Court in Narayani Debi Khaitan v. State of Bihar, Daryao v. State of U.P., and Tilokchand Motichand (supra), and a 3-judge bench in Amrit Lal Berry v. CCE, have reiterated that even in such like cases the court must see the effect of laches. However, that being said, there may be instances where considerations of justice demand that the court adjudicate on the merits of a case rather than summarily dismissing it based solely on procedural grounds such as delay.
One such factual circumstance is when the claim affects the public at large. In Kashinath G. Jalmi (Dr) v. The Speaker, the Court analyzed several precedents (including Tilokchand & Motichand (supra)) and differentiated them by holding that the doctrine of laches cannot be used to expel a claim that is made on behalf of the public. Judicial discretion, while applying this doctrine, must always be governed by the objective of promoting the larger public interest; and if a claim affects the public at large, the Court should go into the merits of the case.
Where it is found that denial of consideration on merits is likely to affect society in general and can have a cascading effect on millions of citizens, the Court will carve out an exception and proceed to decide the lis on merits.
Another vital circumstance where the doctrine of delay and laches would not be applicable strictly is in matters where the vires of a statute are challenged vis-à-vis the Constitution. This Court has, in the due course of time, accepted the idea of transformative constitutionalism, which conceptualizes the Constitution not as a still document cast in stone at the day of its formation but as a living and dynamic body of law, capable of constant updation and evolution as per changing societal mores. Should this Court deny a constitutional challenge solely based on delay, it would effectively establish an arbitrary cut-off beyond which laws could no longer be re-examined in light of changing circumstances.
Such a rigid approach cannot be countenanced as changing societal circumstances sometimes necessitate a reconsideration of the status quo—even when the challenge is brought after a considerable lapse of time. To instantiate, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, held Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to be ultra vires of the Constitution, regardless of the fact that the provision was a part of the statute for over a century. The Court took note of the norms of contemporary society and declared them to be unconstitutional. If the doctrine of laches were to be applied strictly, time would run in favour of a constitutionally invalid statute, which cannot be allowed in the larger interests of justice and the transformative nature of the Constitution.
Reference
In Re: Section 6(a) of Citizenship Act, 1955 (2024)
[1] Tilokchand & Motichand v. HB Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110, para 9