In State of Karnataka v. Union of India (1977) a seven-Judge bench of Supreme Court speaking through MH Beg, CJ held that the powers under Article 194 (as well as Article 105) are those which depend upon and are necessary for the conduct of the business of each House. In that sense, these powers may not even apply to all the privileges which accrue to the House of Commons but may not be necessary for the functioning of the House. The learned Chief Justice stated:
“57. It is evident, from the Chapter in which Article 194 occurs as well as the heading and its marginal note that the “powers” meant to be indicated here are not independent. They are powers which depend upon and are necessary for the conduct of the business of each House. They cannot also be expanded into those of the House of Commons in England for all purposes.
For example, it could not be contended that each House of a State Legislature has the same share of legislative power as the House of Commons has, as a constituent part of a completely sovereign legislature. Under our law it is the Constitution which is sovereign or supreme. The Parliament as well as each Legislature of a State in India enjoys only such legislative powers as the Constitution confers upon it. Similarly, each House of Parliament or State Legislature has such share in legislative power as is assigned to it by the Constitution itself. […]”
Supreme Court held that in India the source of authority is the Constitution which derives its sovereignty from the people. The powers and privileges claimed by a House cannot traverse beyond those which are permissible under the Constitution. The Constitution only allows exercise of those powers, privileges, and immunities which are essential to the functioning of the House or a committee thereof. MN Kaul and SL Shakdher have opined that[1]
“In interpreting these privileges, therefore, regard must be had to the general principle that the privileges of Parliament are granted to members in order that “they may be able to perform their duties in Parliament without let or hindrance”.
They apply to individual members “only insofar as they are necessary in order that the House may freely perform its functions. They do not discharge the member from the obligations to society which apply to him as much and perhaps more closely in that capacity, as they apply to other subjects”.
Privileges of Parliament do not place a member of Parliament on a footing different from that of an ordinary citizen in the matter of the application of laws unless there are good and sufficient reasons in the interest of Parliament itself to do so.”
The evolution of parliamentary privileges as well as the jurisprudence of Supreme Court establish that members of the House or indeed the House itself cannot claim privileges which are not essentially related to their functioning. To give any privilege unconnected to the functioning of the Parliament or Legislature by necessity is to create a class of citizens which enjoys unchecked exemption from ordinary application of the law. This was neither the intention of the Constitution nor the goal of vesting Parliament and Legislature with powers, privileges and immunities.
In Amarinder Singh v. Punjab Vidhan Sabha (2010) a Constitution bench of Supreme Court held that the test to scrutinise the exercise of privileges is whether they were necessary to safeguard the integrity of legislative functions. KG Balakrishnan, CJ after exploring a wealth of material on the subject opined that privileges serve the distinct purpose of safeguarding the integrity of the House. Supreme Court held that privileges are not an end in themselves but must be exercised to ensure the effective exercise of legislative functions. The Chief Justice observed that:
“35. The evolution of legislative privileges can be traced back to medieval England when there was an ongoing tussle for power between the monarch and Parliament. In most cases, privileges were exercised to protect the Members of Parliament from undue pressure or influence by the monarch among others. Conversely, with the gradual strengthening of Parliament there were also some excesses in the name of legislative privileges.
However, the ideas governing the relationship between the executive and the legislature have undergone a sea change since then. In modern parliamentary democracies, it is the legislature which consists of the people’s representatives who are expected to monitor executive functions. This is achieved by embodying the idea of “collective responsibility” which entails that those who wield executive power are accountable to the legislature.
36. However, legislative privileges serve a distinct purpose. They are exercised to safeguard the integrity of legislative functions against obstructions which could be caused by members of the House as well as non-members. Needless to say, it is conceivable that in some instances persons holding executive office could potentially cause obstructions to legislative functions. Hence, there is a need to stress on the operative principles that can be relied on to test the validity of the exercise of legislative privileges in the present case. …
47. […] the exercise of legislative privileges is not an end in itself. They are supposed to be exercised in order to ensure that legislative functions can be exercised effectively, without undue obstructions. These functions include the right of members to speak and vote on the floor of the House as well as the proceedings of various Legislative Committees.
In this respect, privileges can be exercised to protect persons engaged as administrative employees as well. The important consideration for scrutinising the exercise of legislative privileges is whether the same was necessary to safeguard the integrity of legislative functions. […].”
In Lokayukta, Justice Ripusudan Dayal v. State of MP,[2] a three-judge bench of Supreme Court held that the scope of a privilege enjoyed by a House and its members must be tested on the basis of the necessity of the privilege to the House for its free functioning. Supreme Court further held that members of the House cannot claim exemption from the application of ordinary criminal law under the garb of privileges which accrue to them as members of the House under the Constitution. P Sathasivam, CJ opined that
“51. The scope of the privileges enjoyed depends upon the need for privileges i.e. why they have been provided for. The basic premise for the privileges enjoyed by the Members is to allow them to perform their functions as Members and no hindrance is caused to the functioning of the House. […]
52. It is clear that the basic concept is that the privileges are those rights without which the House cannot perform its legislative functions. They do not exempt the Members from their obligations under any statute which continue to apply to them like any other law applicable to ordinary citizens. Thus, enquiry or investigation into an allegation of corruption against some officers of the Legislative Assembly cannot be said to interfere with the legislative functions of the Assembly. No one enjoys any privilege against criminal prosecution. …
76. It is made clear that privileges are available only insofar as they are necessary in order that the House may freely perform its functions. For the application of laws, particularly, the provisions of the Lokayukt Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the jurisdiction of the Lokayukt or the Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment is for all public servants (except the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Madhya Pradesh Vidhan Sabha for the purposes of the Lokayukt Act) and no privilege is available to the officials and, in any case, they cannot claim any privilege more than an ordinary citizen to whom the provisions of the said Acts apply. Privileges do not extend to the activities undertaken outside the House on which the legislative provisions would apply without any differentiation.”
The necessity test for ascertaining parliamentary privileges has struck deep roots in the Indian context. The evolution of parliamentary privileges in various parliamentary jurisdictions has shown a consistent pattern that when an issue involving privileges arises, the test applied is whether the privilege claimed is essential and necessary to the orderly functioning of the House or its committee.
We may also note that the burden of satisfying that a privilege exists and that it is necessary for the House to collectively discharge its function lies with the person or body claiming the privilege. The Houses of Parliament or Legislatures, and the committees are not islands which act as enclaves shielding those inside from the application of ordinary laws. The lawmakers are subject to the same law that the law-making body enacts for the people it governs and claims to represent.
The Court held that the assertion of a privilege by an individual member of Parliament or Legislature would be governed by a twofold test. First, the privilege claimed has to be tethered to the collective functioning of the House, and second, its necessity must bear a functional relationship to the discharge of the essential duties of a legislator.
[1] MN Kaul and SL Shakdher, Practice and Procedure of Parliament, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Metropolitan
Book Co. Pvt. Ltd., 7th ed., 229.
[2] (2014) 4 SCC 473.