“The principle underlying the insistence on hearing causes in open court is to protect and assist fair, impartial and objective administration of justice; but if the requirement of justice itself sometimes dictates the necessity of trying the case in camera, it cannot be said that the said requirement should be sacrificed because of the principle that every trial must be held in open court.”
It is well-settled that in general, all cases brought before the Courts, whether civil, criminal, or others, must be heard in open Court. Public trial in open court is undoubtedly essential for the healthy, objective and fair administration of justice.
Trial held subject to the public scrutiny and gaze naturally acts as a check against judicial caprice or vagaries, and serves as a powerful instrument for creating confidence of the public in the fairness, objectivity, and impartiality of the administration of justice.
Public confidence in the administration of justice is of such great significance that there can be no two opinions on the broad proposition that in discharging their functions as judicial Tribunals, courts must generally hear causes in open and must permit the public admission to the court-room.
As Bentham has observed:
“In the darkness of secrecy sinister interest, and evil in every shape, have full swing. Only in proportion as publicity has place can any of the checks applicable to judicial injustice operate. Where there is no publicity there is no justice. Publicity is the very soul of justice.
It is the keenest spur to exertion and surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the Judge himself while trying under trial (in the sense that) the security of securities is publicity”. (Scott v. Scot (1913))
Exceptions to Open Court
It is necessary to consider whether this rule admits of any exceptions or not. Cases may occur where the requirement of the administration of justice itself may make it necessary for the court to hold a trial in camera.
Trial in Camera means trial without public view where only parties take part in the trial. The proceedings of such trial are also not published in Newspapers. Generally, trial related to marriage, children custody, family issue, rape etc. are conducted under trial.
While emphasising the importance of public trial, we cannot overlook the fact that the primary function of the Judiciary is to do justice between the parties who bring their causes before it. If a Judge trying a cause is satisfied that the very purpose of finding truth in the case would be retarded, or even defeated if witnesses are required to give evidence subject to public gaze, is it or is it not open to him in exercise of his inherent power to hold the trial in camera either partly or fully?
In the case of ‘Naresh Shridhar Mirjakar v. State of Maharashtra (1966)’, the court considered this question in detail, talking about ‘trial in camera’ as an exception to ‘open court’, the court said,
“If the primary function of the court is to do justice in causes brought before it, then on principle, it is difficult to accede to the proposition that there can be no exception to the rule that all causes must be tried in open court. If the principle that all trials before courts must be held in public was treated as inflexible and universal and it is held that it admits of no exceptions whatever, cases may arise where by following the principle, justice itself may be defeated.
That is why we feel no hesitation in holding that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to hold a trial in camera if the ends of justice clearly and necessarily require the adoption of such a course.
It is hardly necessary to emphasise that this inherent power must be exercised with great caution and it is only if the court is satisfied beyond a doubt that the ends of justice themselves would be defeated if a case is tried in open court that it can pass an order to hold the trial in camera; but to deny the existence of such inherent power to the court would be to ignore the primary object of adjudication itself.
The principle underlying the insistence on hearing causes in open court is to protect and assist fair, impartial and objective administration of justice; but if the requirement of justice itself sometimes dictates the necessity of trying the case in camera, it cannot be said that the said requirement should be sacrificed because of the principle that every trial must be held in open court.
If the High Court thus had inherent power to hold the trial of a case in camera, provided, of course, it was satisfied that the ends of justice required such a course to be adopted, it would not be difficult to accept the argument urged by the learned Attorney General that the power to hold a trial in camera must include the power to hold a part of the trial in camera, or to prohibit excessive publication of a part of the proceedings at such trial.
What would meet the ends of justice will always depend upon the facts of each case and the requirements of justice. In a certain case, the Court may feel that the trial may continue to be a public trial, but that the evidence of a particular witness need not receive excessive publicity, because fear of such excessive publicity may prevent the witness from speaking the truth.
That being so, we are unable to hold that the High Court did not possess inherent jurisdiction to pass the impugned order.”
Statutory provisions
Section 53 of Act 4 of 1869 which was passed to amend the law relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in India provides that the whole or any part of any proceeding under this Act may be heard, if the Court thinks fit, with closed doors.
Similarly, section 14 of the Indian Official Secrets Act, 1923 provides that in addition and without prejudice to any powers which a Court may possess to order the exclusion of the public from any proceedings if, in the course of proceedings before a Court against any person for an offence under this Act or the proceedings on appeal,
or in the course of the trial of a person under this Act, application is made by the prosecution, on the ground that the publication of any evidence to be given or of any statement to be made in the course of the proceedings would be prejudicial to the safety of the State, that all or any portion of the public shall be excluded during any part of the hearing, the Court may make an order to that effect, but the passing of sentence shall in any case take place in public.
It would be noticed that while making a specific provision authorising the court to exclude all or any portion of the public from a trial, s.14 in terms recognises the existence of such inherent powers by its opening clause.
Section 22(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 likewise lays down that a proceeding under this Act shall be conducted in camera if either party so desires or if the court so, thinks fit to do, and it shall not be lawful for any person to print or publish any matter in relation to any such proceeding except with the previous permission of the court.
The proviso to s. 352 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, prescribes that the presiding Judge or Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, order at any stage of any inquiry into, or trial of, any particular case, that the public generally, or any particular person, shall not have access to, or be or remain in the room or building used by the Court.
The last provision to which we may refer in this connection is s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This section provides that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.
These statutory provisions merely illustrate how the power of the Court to hold certain trials in camera, either fully or partially, is inevitably associated with the administration of justice itself.
Reference
Naresh Shridhar Mirjakar v. State of Maharashtra (1966)