With the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1858, the administration of India transitioned from the East India Company to the British Crown, bringing about a new administrative framework wherein the Governor, as an agent of the Crown, operated under the general supervision of the Governor-General. While this structure prevailed, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, which culminated into the GoI Act, 1919, marked the early stirrings of responsible government, albeit in a nascent form. Despite this shift, the Governor remained central to the provincial administration, continuing to wield significant authority.
The GoI Act, 1935, ushered in the era of provincial autonomy and formally required the Governor to act on the advice of the Ministers who were accountable to the provincial legislature by abolishing the system of dyarchy at the provincial level, while introducing it at the central level. However, the Act also conferred upon the Governor certain special responsibilities, such as maintaining peace and tranquility within the province and safeguarding minority interests. These responsibilities necessitated the exercise of discretion by the Governor in specific matters.
Further, the autonomy of the Governor in such cases remained subject to the general superintendence and control of the Governor-General, ensuring oversight over the exercise of his individual judgment.
The declaration of Independence brought about a fundamental transformation in the role of the Governor. Until the Constitution came into effect, the provisions of the GoI Act, 1935, as modified by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 (for short, the “Adaptation Order”), governed the administration of the country. Significantly, the Adaptation Order omitted the expressions ‘in his discretion’, ‘acting in his discretion’, and ‘exercising his individual judgment’ from the Act, signaling a departure from the colonial framework.
One of the key decisions that the framers of the Constitution had to take was to decide the mode of selection of the Governor – whether he should be elected by way of a direct election, or selected from a panel of names suggested by the State legislature, or nominated by the President. While in the early days, the Constituent Assembly leaned towards having an elected Governor, as the framing of the Constitution neared its conclusion, there was increasing support in favour of having a Governor nominated by the President.
Jawaharlal Nehru attributed this shift of opinion to the bitter experience of partition, which, according to him, opened the eyes of the Constituent Assembly to the dangers of separatism and the need for having a political structure which focused more on the character of the nation as a Union of States rather than a federation.