Punchhi Commission on Centre-State relations was constituted by the Government of India in 2007 under the chairmanship of Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi, the former Chief Justice of India. The Commission was tasked with the mandate of reviewing the existing arrangements between the Union and States as per the Constitution of India in regard to powers, functions and responsibilities in all spheres including legislative relations, administrative relations, role of Governors, emergency provisions, etc. and recommending such changes as may be appropriate keeping in view practical difficulties, growing challenges of ensuring good governance and the need for strengthening the unity and integrity of the country.
The Commission, inter alia, looked at the original scheme of the Centre-State relations as laid down by the Constitution, examined the friction points in the working thereof and reviewed the adequacy of the constitutional arrangements for promoting social welfare and good governance. One aspect of this study involved looking minutely into the role of the Governor in the federal polity of India. The Commission noted that the role of the Governor became important as he had to balance the political considerations between the Centre and State and be as impartial as possible.
However, as regional political powers grew at the State level, the role of the Governor came to be a point of contention between the Centre and States with the latter leveling allegations of partiality and lack of objectivity in exercise of the Governor’s discretionary powers. As a result, the Commission was enjoined with the task of providing recommendations for better working of the office of the Governor.
a. Role of the Governor
The Commission observed that the nature and scope of rights and powers of the Governor should be understood in the context of a Cabinet system of government. Under such system, the Governor performs a multi-faceted role.
First, as constitutional head of the State, he has a right to be consulted, to warn and encourage. In performance of this role, the Constitution makers ideated the office of Governor to perform the role of a “a friend, philosopher and guide” to his Council of Ministers.
Secondly, the Governor functions as a sentinel of the Constitution and acts as the Union’s representative in the State. As observed by this Court in Rameshwar Prasad & Ors. v. Union of India reported in (2006) 2 SCC 1, the Governor discharges “dual responsibility” to the Union and State.
Further, the Constitution affords the Governor only a persuasive role and not dictatorial powers to override or veto the decisions or proposals of his Council of Ministers. The Commission observed that the Governor, at best, has powers of giving advice or counselling for further reflection of the decision taken by the Council of Ministers. The Governor only flags a need for caution for the purpose of bridging the understanding between the Government and opposition (if there are different governments at the central and state level).
The Governor is not amenable to the directions of the Union government, nor does the Constitution make him accountable to the Centre for the manner in which he carries out his functions and duties. The office of Governor is an independent constitutional office. The Governor, by virtue of Article 163, however, is bound by the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers. Therefore, in the event of a conflict between the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers and the dictates of the Central Government, the scheme of the Constitution indicates that the Governor must adhere to the former.
With the broad tenets of the role of the Governor under the constitutional scheme, the Commission, while appraising the existing framework of Centre-State relations, observed that a major point of friction between the Centre and States is the power of the Governor to reserve any State bill for the consideration of the President, sometimes even for an indefinite period.
b. Discretionary Powers of the Governor
Upon a perusal of Article 163(2), the Commission was of the view that the said provision gives the impression that the Governor has a wide and undefined area of discretionary powers. However, the scope of the discretionary powers of the Governor has to be narrowly construed. The language of Article 163(2) cannot be taken to mean that the Governor has a general discretionary power to act against the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
In continuation to the Sarkaria Commission’s views on the question of discretionary powers of the Governor, the Punchhi Commission report also asserts that the area for the exercise of discretion is limited and even in this limited area, the Governor’s choice of action should neither be nor appear to be arbitrary or fanciful. It must be a choice dictated by reason, actuated by good faith and tempered with caution.
The Commission further emphasized the necessity of prescribing time limits for the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201 respectively in order to ensure that discretionary powers are not exercised by the Governor or the President in a manner that undermines the State legislature and the will of the people.
c. Expediency in Disposal of Bills – Timelines Suggested by the Report of the Commission
The Commission suggested that definite timelines ought to be adopted as salutary conventions for the Governor to either provide assent or reserve the bill for the consideration of the President. Similarly, there should be a time limit for the President to take a decision on the State bill under Article 201 of the Constitution. The Commission was of the view that concrete timelines are sine qua non for the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201 respectively so as to avoid dissensions between the Central and State governments.
The Commission noted that the substantive part of Article 200 does not stipulate time period within which the Governor has to either assent, withhold assent or reserve the bill for Presidential consideration. The requirement of expediency is incumbent upon the Governor only when he decides to return the bill to the State legislature for reconsideration. The same was considered to be evident from the expression “as soon as possible”.
The Commission noted that while the expression “as soon as possible” is mentioned in Article 200 albeit only in the first proviso thereof, there is no such compulsion on the President under Article 201. As a result, the President or the Union Government may kill the bill by not taking a decision on the same, sometimes for the entire duration of the State legislature. This increases the scope for abuse of discretion by the Union government based on political considerations particularly when the ruling party in the State concerned is different from the one enjoying power at the Union level. The lack of a reasonable timeline allows the executive fiat to make inroads into the legislative power of the State thereby thwarting the democratic will of the State legislature. Such invasion of the powers of the State legislature by the Union Executive is questionable in the context of ‘basic features’ of the Constitution.
Therefore, the Commission suggested that a period of six months should be prescribed in Article 201 for the President to decide on assenting or withholding assent to a bill reserved for consideration of the President. In case the President on the aid and advice of the Union Council of Ministers, is unable to give assent to a State bill under Article 201, it is desirable for him to make a reference to the Supreme Court under Article 143 for an opinion. Such reference should be done as a matter of practice in order to avoid allegations of political bias, while securing the dignity and authority of the State legislature.
d. Recommendations
Having considered the challenges in the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201 respectively, the Commission reiterated the recommendations of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (“NCRWC”), which are reproduced hereinbelow:
“After considering the suggestions given by the Sarkaria Commission, the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution gave the following recommendations:
(a) Prescribe a time-limit – say a period of four months – within which the Governor should take a decision whether to grant assent or to reserve it for the consideration of the President;
(b) Delete the words “or that he withholds assent therefrom”. In other words, the power to withhold assent, conferred upon the Governor, by Article 200 should be done away with;
(c) If the Bill is reserved for the consideration of the President, there should be a time-limit, say of three months, within which the President should take a decision whether to accord his assent or to direct the Governor to return it to the State Legislature or to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of the Act under Article 143 (as it happened in the case of Kerala Education Bill in 1958);
(d) When the State Legislature reconsiders and passes the Bill (with or without amendments) after it is returned by the Governor pursuant to the direction of the President, the President should be bound to grant his assent;
(e) To provide that a “Money Bill” cannot be reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President;
(f) In the alternative it may be more advisable to delete altogether the words in Article 200 empowering the Governor to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President except in the case contemplated by the second proviso to Article 200 and in cases where the Constitution requires him to do so. Such a course would not only strengthen the federal principle but would also do away with the anomalous situation, whereunder a Bill passed by the State Legislature can be ‘killed’ by the Union Council of Ministers by advising the President to withhold his assent thereto or just by cold-storaging it.”
The report of the Punchhi Commission advocated for the immediate implementation of the above-mentioned recommendations by way of a Constitutional Amendment.
Reference
State of Tamilnadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu (2025)