The law is well-settled on the point that when a rule-making power is conferred under any statute on an authority, the said power has to be exercised within the confines of the statute and no transgression of the same is permissible.
In this context, we may refer to the decision in Union of India and others v. S. Srinivasan[1] wherein it has been ruled:
“At this stage, it is apposite to state about the rule making powers of a delegating authority. If a rule goes beyond the rule making power conferred by the statute, the same has to be declared ultra vires. If a rule supplants any provision for which power has not been conferred, it becomes ultra vires. The basic test is to determine and consider the source of power which is relatable to the rule. Similarly, a rule must be in accord with the parent statute as it cannot travel beyond it.”
In General Officer Commanding-in-Chief v. Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav[2], the Court held that for a rule to have the effect of a statutory provision, it must fulfil two conditions, firstly it must conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed and secondly, it must also come within the scope and purview of the rule making power of the authority framing the rule and if either of these two conditions is not fulfilled, the rule so framed would be void.
In Kunj Behari Lai Butail and others v. State of H.P. and others[3], it has been laid down that for holding a rule to be valid, it must first be determined as to what is the object of the enactment and then it has to be seen if the rules framed satisfy the test of having been so framed as to fall within the scope of such general power conferred and if the rule making power is not expressed in such a usual general form, then it shall have to be seen if the rules made are protected by the limits prescribed by the parent act.
Another authority which defines the limits and confines within which the rule-making authority shall exercise its delegating powers is Global Energy Limited and another v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission[4], where the question before the Court was regarding the validity of clauses (b) and (f) of Regulation 6- A of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Procedure, Terms and Conditions for Grant of Trading Licence and other Related Matters) Regulations, 2004. The Court gave the following opinion:
“It is now a well-settled principle of law that the rulemaking power “for carrying out the purpose of the Act” is a general delegation. Such a general delegation may not be held to be laying down any guidelines. Thus, by reason of such a provision alone, the Regulation-making power cannot be exercised so as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities which are not contemplated in terms of the provisions of the said Act.”
It was clearly held in this case that the rule-making power, which is provided under a statute with the aim of facilitating the implementation of the statute, does not confer power on any authority to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities which are not contemplated in terms of the provisions of the said Act. The Court, further, went on to hold that:
“The image of law which flows from this framework is its neutrality and objectivity: the ability of law to put sphere of general decision- making outside the discretionary power of those wielding governmental power. Law has to provide a basic level of “legal security” by assuring that law is knowable, dependable and shielded from excessive manipulation. In the contest of rule- making, delegated legislation should establish the structural conditions within which those processes can function effectively.
The question which needs to be asked is whether delegated legislation promotes rational and accountable policy implementation. While we say so, we are not oblivious of the contours of the judicial review of the legislative Acts. But, we have made all endeavours to keep ourselves confined within the well-known parameters.”
At this stage, we may also benefit from the observations made in State of T.N. and another v. P. Krishnamurthy and others[5] wherein it was stated that where a rule is directly inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the statute, then, of course, the task of the court is simple and easy. This implies that if a rule is directly hit for being violative of the provisions of the enabling statute, then the Courts need not have to look in any other direction but declare the said rule as invalid on the said ground alone.
[1] (2012) 7 SCC 683
[2] AIR 1988 SC 876
[3] AIR 2000 SC 1069
[4] (2009) 15 SCC 570
[5] (2006) 4 SCC 517