The provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution of India are meant to further the cause of justice and to secure complete justice. The directions in the exercise of power under Article 142 cannot be issued to defeat justice. The jurisdiction under Article 142 can be invoked only to deal with extraordinary situations for doing complete justice between the parties before the Court.
While dealing with the scope of power under Article 142, a Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Prem Chand Garg & Anr. v. The Excise Commissioner, U.P. and Ors. , in paragraphs 12 and 13 held thus:
“12. Basing himself on this decision, the Solicitor-General argues that the power conferred on Supreme Court under Article 142(1) is comparable to the privileges claimed by the members of the State Legislatures under the latter part of Article 194(3), and so, there can be no question of striking down an order passed by Supreme Court under Article 142(1) on the ground that it is inconsistent with Article 32.
It would be noticed that this argument proceeds on the basis that the order for security infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 32 and it suggests that under Article 142(1) Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass such an order. In our opinion, the argument thus presented is misconceived. In this connection, it is necessary to appreciate the actual decision in the case of Sharma [(1959) 1 SCR 806 at 859-860] and its effect.
The actual decision was that the rights claimable under the latter part of Article 194(3) were not subject to Article 19(1)(a), because the said rights had been expressly provided for by a constitutional provision viz. Article 194(3), and it would be impossible to hold that one part of the Constitution is inconsistent with another part. The position would, however, be entirely different if the State Legislature was to pass a law in regard to the privileges of its members.
Such a law would obviously have to be consistent with Article 19(1)(a). If any of the provisions of such a law were to contravene any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III, they would be struck down as being unconstitutional.
Similarly, there can be no doubt that if in respect of petitions under Article 32 a law is made by Parliament as contemplated by Article 145(1), and such a law, in substance, corresponds to the provisions of Order 25 Rule 1 or Order 41 Rule 10, it would be struck down on the ground that it purports to restrict the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 32. The position of an order made either under the rules framed by Supreme Court or under the jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 142(1) can be no different.
If this aspect of the matter is borne in mind, there would be no difficulty in rejecting the Solicitor-General’s argument based on Article 142(1). The powers of Supreme Court are no doubt very wide and they are intended to be and will always be exercised in the interest of justice. But that is not to say that an order can be made by Supreme Court which is inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.
An order which Supreme Court can make in order to do complete justice between the parties, must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws. Therefore, we do not think it would be possible to hold that Article 142(1) confers upon Supreme Court powers which can contravene the provisions of Article 32.
13. In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out that the wide powers which are given to Supreme Court for doing complete justice between the parties, can be used by Supreme Court, for instance, in adding parties to the proceedings pending before it, or in admitting additional evidence, or in remanding the case, or in allowing a new point to be taken for the first time. It is plain that in exercising these and similar other powers, Supreme Court would not be bound by the relevant provisions of procedure if it is satisfied that a departure from the said procedure is necessary to do complete justice between the parties.”
Another Constitution Bench in the case of Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr.[1], in paragraphs 47 and 48, held thus:
“47. The plenary powers of Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and are complementary to those powers which are specifically conferred on the Court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers are of very wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers.
This power exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction apart from the statutes. It stands upon the foundation and the basis for its exercise may be put on a different and perhaps even wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which Supreme Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to do complete justice between the parties, while administering justice according to law.
There is no doubt that it is an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is free from the restraint of jurisdiction and operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of the Court to prevent “clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice”. It, however, needs to be remembered that the powers conferred on the Court by Article 142 being curative in nature cannot be construed as powers which authorise the Court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant while dealing with a cause pending before it.
This power cannot be used to “supplant” substantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of the Court. Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly.
Punishing a contemner advocate, while dealing with a contempt of court case by suspending his licence to practice, a power otherwise statutorily available only to the Bar Council of India, on the ground that the contemner is also an advocate, is, therefore, not permissible in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The construction of Article 142 must be functionally informed by the salutary purposes of the article, viz., to do complete justice between the parties.
It cannot be otherwise. As already noticed in a case of contempt of court, the contemner and the court cannot be said to be litigating parties.
48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice “between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it”.
The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by “ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter before it. Indeed Supreme Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling.
It is well recognised and established that Supreme Court has always been a law-maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a “problem-solver in the nebulous areas” (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655: 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject-matter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by Supreme Court, while making an order under Article 142.
Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.”
It is very difficult to exhaustively lay down the parameters for the exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India due to the very nature of such powers.
However, a few important parameters which are relevant to the issues involved in the reference are as follows:-
(i) The jurisdiction can be exercised to do complete justice between the parties before the Court. It cannot be exercised to nullify the benefits derived by a large number of litigants based on judicial orders validly passed in their favour who are not parties to the proceedings before Supreme Court;
(ii) Article 142 does not empower Supreme Court to ignore the substantive rights of the litigants; and
(iii) While exercising the jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, Supreme Court can always issue procedural directions to the Courts for streamlining procedural aspects and ironing out the creases in the procedural laws to ensure expeditious and timely disposal of cases. This is because, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 142, Supreme Court may not be bound by procedural requirements of law.
However, while doing so, Supreme Court cannot affect the substantive rights of those litigants who are not parties to the case before it. The right to be heard before an adverse order is passed is not a matter of procedure but a substantive right.
(iv) The power of Supreme Court under Article 142 cannot be exercised to defeat the principles of natural justice, which are an integral part of our jurisprudence.
Reference
As decided by the Supreme Court in High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of UP (2024)
[1] (1998) 4 SCC 409