Section 5 of the Limitation Act, reads as under: –
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.— Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which corresponds to the erstwhile Section 5 of the now-repealed Limitation Act, 1908, confers upon the courts the discretionary power to admit any appeal or application (except that under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) if filed after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, provided the erring party is able to show to the court a sufficient cause for not filing the same within the stipulated period of limitation, and the court is satisfied with sufficiency of such cause. It is only in cases, where such “sufficient cause” for the resultant delay in filing / presenting of the appeal or application is shown by the defaulting party, and the courts are satisfied with the explanation and sufficiency of such cause that the recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be taken by the courts, and in exercise of its discretion the delay be condoned and thereby admit the appeal or application.
Expressions “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period
In Shivamma (dead) by lrs …appellant(s) versus karnataka housing board & ors. (2025), the Supreme Court interpreted the terms as follows:
The text of the provision stipulates that where an appeal or application, as the case may be, is not filed within the prescribed period of limitation, the same may be admitted if “sufficient cause” for such failure is shown. The court may, in its discretion, proceed to condone the delay, if it is satisfied, that the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, had “sufficient cause” for not preferring the appeal or making the application, respectively, “within such period”.
A plain yet careful reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, leaves very little to imagination insofar as how the import of the phrase “within such period” should be construed for the purpose of the said provision. The aforesaid phrase cannot be singled out and construed devoid of the context provided by the other expressions used throughout the provision. The expression should be interpreted and understood in the precise context in which it has been employed in the bare text of the provision. The provision of Section 5, itself makes it amply clear how the phrase “within such period” ought to be understood by supplying the necessary context and interpretive key, through two significant phrases, namely; “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring the appeal or making the application”.
We say so because, the use of the word “such” in “within such period” signifies that it is alluding to something that the legislature has already alluded to within the provision, and thus, the significance of this phrase, has to be necessarily construed in reference to the expressions “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring … or making … within such period”. 29. The phrase “within such period” has been consciously prefaced by the legislature with the expression “for not preferring the appeal or making the application”. This prefatory expression denotes that period of window within which the appeal or the application, as the case may be, was required or expected to be instituted under the law.
It signifies the original period within which, the appeal or the application, should have been filed, if not for the delay. It refers to none other than that period within which, the appeal or application, could have been instituted in the first place, had there been no delay, or, to put it simply, the statutory period of limitation, within which, such an appeal or application, should have ordinarily been filed.
The negative terminology couched in “for not preferring … or making” is suggestive of the lapse or default that the appellant or applicant, as the case may be, has committed in preferring the appeal or application, respectively, which is nothing but the failure to file it within the prescribed statutory period of limitation. This is further reinforced when one considers the meaning that would have been derived, if the negative language used in the provision is stripped away, or in other words, by understanding the opposite meaning of the aforesaid phrase, which the legislature has deliberately chosen not to provide by use of the negative language “for not”.
By removing or inverting the said negative connotation from the phrase “for not preferring … or making”, the expression would then inevitably have connoted that point of time at which the appeal or application, as the case may be, ought to have been instituted or the period within which, the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, was otherwise well within its right to prefer the appeal or make the application, respectively.
The aforesaid makes it crystal clear that the legislature, by employing the phrase “for not preferring the appeal or making the application”, is unmistakably alluding to the original statutory period of limitation within which the appeal or application, as the case may be, was required to be instituted or simpliciter the prescribed period of limitation, for the purpose of construing the expression “within such period”.
However, one must be mindful that the aforesaid is not the only time period that has been mentioned in the language of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In other words, the meaning of the expression “within such period” does not refer to only the original period of limitation.
One another expression of significance that, the legislature has introduced, within the text of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is “after the prescribed period”. This expression refers to the point of time when the appeal or application, as the case may be, in question, has come to be instituted, which is, after the statutory period of limitation expired. It denotes the period after the prescribed limitation had run out till the actual date when the filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be, took place.
By use of the phrase “after the prescribed period”, it is clear that the legislature, for the purpose of construing the expression “within such period”, has contemplated to also include the time period after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation till the actual date of filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. In Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the phrases “for not preferring the appeal or making the application” and “after the prescribed period” have been used by the legislature conjointly to assign meaning to the expression “within such period”.
As already discussed, the former refers to the period in which the appeal or the application was required by the law to be filed within, while the latter signifies the period within which such appeal or application, is being filed or in other words, the original prescribed period of limitation and the period after the expiry of limitation till the actual date of institution, respectively.
When one reads the phrase “within such period” together with the expressions “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring the appeal or making the application”, it becomes as clear as a noon day, that the said phrase i.e., “within such period” includes both the original period of limitation prescribed as-well as the period of delay leading up to the actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. There can be no question of construing “within such period” as making a reference either to only the original period of limitation or to only the actual period of delay after the expiry of limitation.
It is a well settled rule of statutory interpretation that while construing a provision, a meaningful effect should be given to each and every word usedby the legislature within the text of the provision. In interpreting a provision, a coherent meaning has to be culled out from the entire scheme of the Act and the provisions contained therein. The entire text of the provision must be read holistically with the entire Act, in toto, and harmoniously integrated with the other provisions to preserve internal consistency. Stray lines or words of a provision cannot be isolated or construed in fragments, detached from the remaining words and expressions of the provision as-well as the other provisions within the statute.
Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that both the expressions, by a necessary implication indicate that the phrase “within such period” signifies that the period covered therein extends to not only the original period within which, the appeal or the application, as the case may be, should have been filed, if not for the delay, but also the period taken in addition to the prescribed period of limitation for filing such appeal or application, as the case may be.
As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained by demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause” that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal orapplication, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.