As regards the principles enunciated by Supreme Court regarding the nature and the standard of proof of corrupt practice alleged by an election petitioner against the successful candidate, the ratio of some of the important decisions may be briefly stated.
To begin with, as far back as 1959 in Ram Dial v. Sant Lal Ors., [1959] 2 supp. S.C.R. 748, the Court observed thus:
“What is material under the Indian law, is not the actual effect produced, but the doing of such acts as are calculated to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right. Decisions of the English Courts, based on the words of the English Statute, which are not strictly in pari materia with the words of the Indian statute, cannot, therefore, be used as precedents in this country.”
In Samant N. Balakrishna, etc. v. George Fernandez & Ors. etc.., [1969] 3 S.C.R. 603, Supreme Court while dwelling on the principles to be followed in election cases pithily point out thus:
“The principle of law is settled that consent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence but the circumstances must point unerringly to the conclusion and must not admit of any other explanation. Although the trial of an election petition is made in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure it has been laid down that a corrupt practice must be proved in the same way as a criminal charge is proved. In other words, the election petitioner must exclude every hypothesis except that of guilt on the part of the returned candidate or his election agent.”
In Ch. Razik Ram v. Ch. Jaswant Singh Chouhan & Ors. [1975] 4 S.C.C. 769, Supreme Court laid down the following principles:
“Before considering as to whether the charges of corrupt practice were established, it is important to remember the standard of proof required in such cases. It is well settled that a charge of corrupt practice is substantially akin to a criminal charge. The commission of a corrupt practice entails serious penal consequences. It not only vitiates the election of the candidate concerned but also disqualifies him from taking, part in elections for a considerably long time. Thus, the trial of an election petition being in the nature of an accusation, bearing the indelible stamp of quasi-criminal action, the standard of proof is the same as in a criminal trial.
Secondly, even if the nature of the trial of an election petition is not the same in all respects as that of a criminal trial, the burden of proving each and every ingredient of the charge in an election petition remains on the petitioner. If a fact constituting or relevant to such an ingredient is pre-eminently within the knowledge of the respondent, it may affect the quantum of its proof but does not relieve the petitioner of his primary burden.”
In Balwan Singh v. Prakash Chand & Ors. [1976] 3 S.C.R. 335, Shinghal,J. made the following observations:
“Another argument of Mr. Bindra was that the corrupt practice in question should not have been found to have been committed as the election petitioners did not examine themselves during the course of the trial in the High Court. There was however no such obligation on them, and the evidence which the election petitioners were able to produce at the trial could not have been rejected for any such fanciful reason when there was nothing to show that the election petitioners were able to give useful evidence to their personal knowledge but stayed away purposely.”
In the case of Sultan Salahuddin Owasi v. Mohd. Osman Shaheed & Ors.[1980] 3 S.C.C. 281, Supreme Court observed thus:-
“It is now well settled by a large catena of the authorities of Supreme Court that a charge of corrupt practice must be proved to the hilt, the standard of proof of such allegation s the same as a charge of fraud in a criminal case.
In Ram Sharan Yadav v. Thakur Muneshwar Nath Singh & Ora. [1984] 4 S.C.C. 649, Supreme Court observed thus:
“The sum and substance of these decisions is that a charge of corrupt practice has to be proved by convincing evidence and not merely by preponderance of probabilities. As the charge of a corrupt practice is in the nature of a criminal charge, it is for the party who sets up the plea of ‘ undue influence’ to prove it to the hilt beyond reasonable doubt and the manner of proof should be the same as for an offence in a criminal case.
This is more so because once it is proved to the satisfaction of a court that a candidate has been guilty of ‘undue influence’ then he is likely to be disqualified for a period of six years or such other period as the authority concerned under Section 8-A of the Act may think fit.
By and large, the Court in such cases while appreciating or analysing the evidence must be guided by the following considerations:
(1) the nature, character, respectability and credibility of the evidence,
(2) the surrounding circumstances and the improbability appearing in the case,
(3) the slowness of the appellate court to disturb a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court who had the initial advantage of observing the behaviour, character and demeanour of the witnesses appearing before it, and
(4) the totality of the effect of the entire evidence which leaves a lasting impression regarding the corrupt practices alleged.”
This, therefore, concludes the question regarding the standard of proof.