Article 14 guarantees that the “State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”

Standard to test the validity of laws against Article 14

Equality is a crucial aspect of the constitutional vision. Immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, Supreme Court laid down the standard to test the validity of laws against Article 14.

In a Constitution Bench decision in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India,[1] Justice B.K. Mukherjea articulated that a classification under Article 14 “should never be arbitrary”. It was held that such classification must always “rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect to which the classification is made”. If a classification is “made without any substantial basis”, it should be “regarded as invalid”.

The principle of classification was reiterated in a subsequent Constitution Bench decision in State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara.[2]

Later, a seven-judge Bench decision in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar[3] solidified the requirement of the twin test under Article 14. Speaking for the Court, Justice S.R. Das held:

“In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely

(1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others, and

(2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The differentia, which is the basis of the classification, and the object of the act are distinct things, and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them.

In short, while the Article forbids class legislation in the sense of making improper discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred or the liability proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sense I have just explained..”

Adding to the above principles, Justice S.R. Das, in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar,[4] held that the classification “may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like”, but it needs to have a reasonable nexus with the object of the statute. It was held that “Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure”.

Furthermore, the Court “may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation”.

The Court further reiterated that: “A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing or to several individual persons or things but no reasonable basis of classification may appear on the face of it or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances, or matters of common knowledge. In such a case the court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination…”

Subsequently, in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,[5] a Constitution Bench of Supreme Court added a crucial principle of non-arbitrariness to the discourse of equality under Article 14. The Court was adjudicating the validity of an administrative order. The Court held that:

“Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed, cabined and confined” within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14…”

The principle of non-arbitrariness and reasonableness was then emphasized in the seven-judge Bench decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.[6] It was held:

“Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness, pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14.

It must be “right and just and fair” and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.”

The Test of Intelligible Difference- How far valid

To test the validity of laws, the twin test of intelligible differentia and reasonable nexus held ground. Whether the test of arbitrariness is a valid principle under Article 14 led to a conflicting set of decisions.[7]

In Shayara Bano v. Union of India,[8] in testing the validity of Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 which validates the triple talaq, Justice R.F. Nariman endorsed the test of manifest arbitrariness. It was held:

“The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle.

Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.”

A formalistic understanding of the classification test was then critiqued by Supreme Court in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India.[9] The Court was dealing with a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Act, 1860, to the extent that it criminalized consensual sexual conduct between adults. In his concurring opinion, Justice DY Chandrachud held:

“Equating the content of equality with the reasonableness of a classification on which a law is based advances the cause of legal formalism. The problem with the classification test is that what constitutes a reasonable classification is reduced to a mere formula: the quest for an intelligible differentia and the rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. In doing so, the test of classification risks elevating form over substance. The danger inherent in legal formalism lies in its inability to lay threadbare the values which guide the process of judging constitutional rights.

Legal formalism buries the life-giving forces of the Constitution under a mere mantra. What it ignores is that Article 14 contains a powerful statement of values—of the substance of equality before the law and the equal protection of laws. To reduce it to a formal exercise of classification may miss the true value of equality as a safeguard against arbitrariness in State action. As our constitutional jurisprudence has evolved towards recognising the substantive content of liberty and equality, the core of Article 14 has emerged out of the shadows of classification.

Article 14 has a substantive content on which, together with liberty and dignity, the edifice of the Constitution is built. Simply put, in that avatar, it reflects the quest for ensuring fair treatment of the individual in every aspect of human. The judges declared that Section 377 is manifestly arbitrary.

The doctrine of manifest arbitrariness was also adopted in the Constitution Bench decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India.[10] Referring to the decisions in Shayara Bano, Navtej Johar, and Joseph Shine, a Constitution Bench in Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) v. Union of India[11] summarized the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness in the following words:

“Courts while testing the validity of a law on the ground of manifest arbitrariness have to determine if the statute is capricious, irrational and without adequate determining principle, or something which is excessive and disproportionate. Supreme Court has applied the standard of “manifest arbitrariness” in the following manner:

a. A provision lacks an “adequate determining principle” if the purpose is not in consonance with constitutional values.

In applying this standard, Courts must make a distinction between the “ostensible purpose”, that is, the purpose which is claimed by the State and the “real purpose”, the purpose identified by Courts based on the available material such as a reading of the provision; and

b. A provision is manifestly arbitrary even if the provision does not make a classification.”

The Constitution Bench further elucidated the standards of manifest arbitrariness to test the validity of a plenary legislation with those of subordinate legislation:

“The above discussion shows that manifest arbitrariness of a subordinate legislation has to be primarily tested vis-a-vis its conformity with the parent statute. Therefore, in situations where a subordinate legislation is challenged on the ground of manifest arbitrariness, Supreme Court will proceed to determine whether the delegate has failed “to take into account very vital facts which either expressly or by necessary implication are required to be taken into consideration by the statute or, say, the Constitution.”

In contrast, application of manifest arbitrariness to a plenary legislation passed by a competent legislation requires the Court to adopt a different standard because it carries greater immunity than a subordinate legislation. We concur with Shayara Bano (supra) that a legislative action can also be tested for being manifestly arbitrary. However, we wish to clarify that there is, and ought to be, a distinction between plenary legislation and subordinate legislation when they are challenged for being manifestly arbitrary.”

The Court recently in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh[12] dealt with whether sub-classification among the Scheduled Castes is permissible under Article 14. The seven-judge bench reiterated that the State is allowed to classify in a manner that is not discriminatory. The Court summarized the twin-test of classification as follows:

“The Constitution permits valid classification if two conditions are fulfilled. First, there must be an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons grouped together from others left out of the group. The phrase “intelligible differentia” means difference capable of being understood. The difference is capable of being understood when there is a yardstick to differentiate the class included and others excluded from the group. In the absence of the yardstick, the differentiation would be without a basis and hence, unreasonable.

The basis of classification must be deducible from the provisions of the statute; surrounding circumstances or matters of common knowledge. In making the classification, the State is free to recognize degrees of harm. Though the classification need not be mathematical in precision, there must be some difference between the persons grouped and the persons left out, and the difference must be real and pertinent. The classification is unreasonable if there is “little or no difference”.

Second, the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law, that is, the basis of classification must have a nexus with the object of the classification.”

Summing Up

The constitutional standards laid down by the Court under Article 14 can be summarized as follows.

First, the Constitution permits classification if there is intelligible differentia and reasonable nexus with the object sought.

Second, the classification test cannot be merely applied as a mathematical formula to reach a conclusion. A challenge under Article 14 has to take into account the substantive content of equality which mandates fair treatment of an individual.

Third, in undertaking classification, a legislation or subordinate legislation cannot be manifestly arbitrary, i.e. courts must adjudicate whether the legislature or executive acted capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle, or did something which is excessive and disproportionate.

In applying this constitutional standard, courts must identify the “real purpose” of the statute rather than the “ostensible purpose” presented by the State, as summarized in ADR.

Fourth, a provision can be found manifestly arbitrary even if it does not make a classification.

Fifth, different constitutional standards have to be applied when testing the validity of legislation as compared to subordinate legislation.

Reference

Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India (2024)


[1] 1950 SCR 869

[2] 1951 SCR 682

[3] (1952) 1 SCC 1

[4] 1959 SCR 279

[5](1974) 4 SCC 3  

[6] (1978) 1 SCC 248

[7] The conflicting judgments have been summarized in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113

[8] (2017) 9 SCC 1

[9] (2018) 10 SCC 1

[10] (2019) 3 SCC 39

[11] 2024 INSC 113

[12] 2024 INSC 652