The Supreme Court said in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1960), that in recent years the words “compelling reasons” have become words of magic incantation in every appeal against acquittal. The words are so elastic that they are not capable of easy definition; with the result, their interpretation varied between two extreme views-one holding that if a trial court acquitted an accused, an appellate court shall not take a different view unless the finding is such that no reasonable person will come to that conclusion, and the other accepting only the conscience of the appellate court as the yardstick to ascertain whether there are reasons to compel its interference.

The scope of the powers of an appellate court in an appeal

The scope of the powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal has been elucidated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor[1]. There Lord Russell observed at p. 404 thus:

“…….. the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as

(1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses,

(2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial,

(3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and

(4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses Adverting to the facts of the case, the Privy Council proceeded to state, “

…….. They have no reason to think that the High Court failed to take all proper matters into consideration in arriving at their conclusions of fact.”

These two passages indicate the principles to be followed by an appellate court in disposing of an appeal against acquittal and also the proper care it should take in re- evaluating the evidence.

The Privy Council explained its earlier observations in Nur Mohammad v. Emperor[2] thus at p. 152:

“Their Lordships do not think it necessary to read it all again, but would like to observe that there really is only one principle, in the strict use of the word, laid down there; that is that the High Court has full power to review at large all the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed.”

These two decisions establish that the power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal is not different from that it has in an appeal against conviction; the difference lies more in the manner of approach and perspective rather than in the content of the power. These decisions defining the scope of the power of an appellate court had been followed by all the courts in India till the year 1951 when, it is said, Supreme Court in Surajpal Singh v. The State[3] laid down a different principle. But a perusal of that judgment does not bear out the construction which is very often placed thereon. The passage relied upon is found at p. 201 and it reads thus:

“It is well-established that in an appeal under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.”

On the facts of that case Supreme Court held, “we are inclined to hold that the Sessions Judge had taken a reasonable view of the facts of the case, and in our opinion there were no good reasons for reversing that view”.

While analysing these above referred case, the Supreme Court in Sanwat Case (Supra), had the view that these observations are nothing more than a restatement of the law laid down by the Privy Council and the application of the same to the facts of the case before the Court. Though in one paragraph the learned Judges used the words “substantial and compelling reasons” and in the next paragraph the words “good reasons”, these observations were not intended to record any disagreement with the observations of Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup’s case as to matters a High Court would keep in view when exercising its power under s. 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. If it had been so intended, Supreme Court would have at least referred to Sheo Swarup’s case, which it did not.

The same words were again repeated by Supreme Court in Ajmer Singh v. The State of Punjab. [4]In that case the appellate court set aside an order of acquittal on the ground that the accused had failed to explain the circumstances appearing against him. Supreme Court held that as the presumption of innocence of an accused is reinforced by the order of acquittal, the appellate court could have interfered only for substantial and compelling reasons. The observations made in respect of the earlier decisions applied to this case also.

Mahajan, J., as he then was, delivering the judgment of the court in Puran v. State of Punjab[5] again used the words “very substantial and compelling reasons”, but immediately thereafter the learned Judge referred to the decision of Sheo Swarup’s case and narrated the circumstances which an appellate court should bear in mind in interfering with an order of acquittal. This juxtaposition of the so-called formula and the circumstances narrated in Sheo Swarup’s case (supra) indicate that the learned Judge used those words only to comprehend the statement of law made by the Privy Council. Mukherjea, J., as he then was, in C. M. Narayan v. State of Travancore- Cochin[6] again referred to the Privy Council decision and affirmed the wide power of an appellate court and also the proper approach in an appeal against acquittal. The learned Judge did not introduce any further limitation on the power of the appellate court. But it was observed that the High Court had not clearly kept before it the well settled principles and reversed the decision of the trial court ‘without noticing or giving due weight and consideration to important matters relied upon by that court’.

In Tulsiram Kanu v. The State[7] Supreme Court used a different phraseology to describe the approach of an appellate court against an order of acquittal. There the Sessions Court expressed that there was clearly reasonable doubt in respect of the guilt of the accused on the evidence put before it. Kania, C. J., observed that it required good and sufficiently cogent reasons to overcome such reasonable doubt before the appellate court came to a different conclusion. This observation was made in connection with a High Court’s judgment which had not taken into consideration the different detailed reasons given by the Sessions Judge.

In Madan Mohan Singh’s case[8], on appeal by special leave, Supreme Court said that the High Court ‘had not kept the rules and principles of administration of criminal justice clearly before it and that therefore the judgment was vitiated by non-advertence to and misapprehension of various material facts transpiring in evidence and the consequent failure to give true weight and consideration to the findings upon which the trial court based its decision’.

In Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M. P. [9] Supreme Court again cited the passage from the decision of the Privy Council extracted above and applied it to the facts of that case. In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, Bhagwati, J., speaking for the Court, after referring to an earlier decision of Supreme Court, accepted the principle laid down by the Privy Council and, indeed, restated the observations of the Privy Council in four propositions. It may be noticed that the learned Judge did not use the words cc substantial and compelling reasons”.

In S. A. A. Biyabani v. The State of Madras[10], Jagannadhadas, J., after referring to the earlier decisions, observed at p. 647 thus:

“While no doubt on such an appeal the High Court was entitled to go into the facts and arrive at its own estimate of the evidence, it is also settled law that, where the case turns on oral evidence of witnesses, the estimate of such evidence by the trial court is not to be lightly set aside.”

The learned Judge did not repeat the so-called formula but in effect accepted the approach of the Privy Council. The question was again raised prominently in the Supreme Court in Aher Raja Khima ,”v. The State of Saurashtra[11]. Bose, J., expressing the majority view, stated at p. 1287 thus:

“It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong: Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab[12]; and if the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference under section 417 is not justifiable unless there are really strong reasons for reversing that view.”

It may be noticed that the learned Judge equated “substantial and compelling reasons” with “strong reasons”. Kapur, J., in bhagwan Das V. State of Rajasthan referred to the earlier decisions and observed that the High Court should not set aside an acquittal unless there are ” substantial and compelling reasons” for doing so.

In Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab[13], Supreme Court observed much to the same effect thus at p. 222:

“It is now well settled that though the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded, it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused person is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial Court and the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses must be given proper weight and consideration; and the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses must also be kept in mind and there must be substantial and compelling reasons for the appellate Court to come to a conclusion different from that of the trial Judge.”

These observations only restate the principles laid down by Supreme Court in earlier decisions. There are other decisions of Supreme Court where, without discussion, Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the High Courts where they interfered with an order of acquittal without violating the principles laid down by the Privy Council.

Principles to follow while deciding the appeal against acquittal and conviction

The Court in Sanwat Singh (Supra) while laying down the principles said that there is no difficulty in applying the principles laid down by the Privy Council, and accepted by Supreme Court, to the facts of each case. But appellate courts are finding considerable difficulty in understanding the scope of the words “substantial and compelling reasons” used by Supreme Court in the decisions cited above. Supreme Court obviously did not and could not add a condition to s. 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The words were intended to convey the idea that an appellate court not only shall bear in mind the principles laid down by the Privy Council but also must give its clear reasons for coming to the conclusion that the order of acquittal was wrong. The foregoing discussion yields the following results:

(1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded;

(2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup’s case(supra) afford a correct guide for the appellate court’s approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal; and

(3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of Supreme Court, such as,

(i) “substantial and compelling reasons”,

(ii) “good and sufficiently cogent reasons”, and

(iii) “strong reasons” are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified.

[1] (1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 398

[2] A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 151

[3] [1952] S.C.R. 193

[4] [1953] S.C.R. 418

[5] A I.R. 1933 S.C. 459

[6] A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 478

[7] A.I.R. 1954 8.C. I.

[8] A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 637

[9] A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 15

[10] A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 645

[11] [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1285

[12] [1953] S.C.P. 418, 423

[13] A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 216