In Harichand Vs. Director of School Education, (1998) 2 SCC 383, Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of Section 12 of the 1958, Act and held as under: –

“In our view, Section 12 of the probation of offenders Act would apply only in respect of a disqualification that goes with a conviction under law which provides for the offence and its punishment. That is the plain meaning of the words “disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law” therein.

Where the law that provides for an offence and its punishment also stipulates a disqualification, a person convicted of the offence but released on probation does not by reason of Section 12, suffers the disqualification. It cannot be held that by reason of Section 12, a conviction for an offence should not be taken into account for the purposes of dismissal of the person convicted from government service.”

In Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway & Anr. Vs. T.R. Chellappan, AIR 1975 SC 2216, Supreme Court observed that the conviction of an accused, or the finding of the Court that he is guilty, does not stand washed away because that is the sine-qua-non for the order of release on probation. The order of release on probation is merely in substitution of the sentence to be imposed by the Court. Thus, the factum of guilt on the criminal charge is not swept away merely by passing the order under the Act, 1958.

In Trikha Ram Vs. V.K. Seth & Anr, (1987) Supp. SCC 39, Supreme Court had held that if a person stands convicted and is given the benefit of the provisions of the 1958, Act, he can be removed from service only on the ground that he stood convicted. But by virtue of the provisions of Section 12 of the 1958, Act, his removal cannot be a “disqualification” for the purposes provided in other Statutes such as the Representation of the People Act, 1950.

The same view has been reiterated by Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Bakshi Ram, (1990) 2 SCC 426; Karam Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., (1996) 7 SCC 748; and Additional Deputy Inspector General of Police, Hyderabad Vs. P.R.K. Mohan, (1997) 11 SCC 571.

In Shankar Dass Vs. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1985 SC 772, Supreme Court has held that the order of dismissal from service, consequent upon a conviction, is not a disqualification within the meaning of Section 12 of the 1958, Act. The court held as under: –

“There are Statutes which provide that the persons, who are convicted for certain offences, shall incur certain disqualification; for example, Chapter III of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 entitles ‘disqualification’ for Membership of Parliament and State Legislatures, and Chapter IV entitles ‘disqualification’ for voting, contains the provisions which disqualify persons convicted of certain charges from being the Members of Legislatures or from voting at election to the legislature. That is the sense in which the word ‘disqualification’ is used in Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act…….

Therefore, it is not possible to accept the reasoning of the High Court that Section 12 of the 1958 Act takes away the effect of conviction forthe purpose of service also.”

In State of U.P. Vs. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1201, Supreme Court has held that the High Court, while deciding a criminal case and giving the benefit of the U.P. First Offenders Probation Act, 1958, or similar enactment, has no competence to issue any direction that the accused shall not suffer any civil consequences. The Court has held as under:

“We also fail to understand, how the High Court, while deciding a criminal case, can direct that the accused must be deemed to have been in continuous service without break, and, therefore, he should be paid his full pay and dearness allowance during the period of his suspension. This direction and observation is wholly without jurisdiction….”

In Union of India Vs. Trilochan Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1612, some part of the Judgment in T.R. Chellappan (supra) was overruled by the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court. But the observations cited hereinbefore were not overruled.

In Sushil Kumar Singal v. Regional Manager Punjab National Bank (2010) The Supreme Court said, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that the conviction of an employee in an offence permits the disciplinary authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee or to take appropriate steps for his dismissal/removal only on the basis of his conviction.