23-March-2021 to 29-March-2021
CRYPTIC CALL ABOUT COMMISSION OF AN COGNISABLE OFFENCE CANNOT BE TREATED AS AN FIR: SC
Netaji Achyut Shinde v. State Of Maharashtra
In this recent case,the Bench of Justices L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta and S. Ravindra Bhat was hearing an appeal filed by a man who contended before the apex court that the telephonic call which was firstly received by the police shall be treated as First information report not the subsequent report in which his name is falsely implicated in the commission of an offence. However, on the basis of facts and circumstances, the court rejected the contentions made by the accused and held that the telephonic message or call made by a person which does not clearly specify the commission of an offence cannot be treated as a First Information Report always and the subsequent report made by the police on the basis of the accounts given by witnesses and the dying declaration of the victim shall be treated as the First Information Report.Therefore, the hon’ble court uphold the conviction order made by the Bombay High court.
THE COURTS HAVE DISCRETION TO CONDONE DELAY UNDER SECTION 5 OF LIMITATION ACT EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF APPLICATION REGARDING DELAY: SC
Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd
The hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgement held that the court or tribunal have no bar to exercise its discretion to condone the delay even in the absence of any formal application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The court noted that Section 5 does not speak of any application and it enables the Court to admit an application or appeal if the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the time prescribed.
In the case of Nand Singh v. Estate Officer, 1993, it was observed by the court that, a written application for claiming relief under section 5 is not essential and in a fit case, it is open to a court without a written application to give relief under this section if the interest of justice so requires.
UNDER SECTION 17 OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, THE DIVORCED WIFE IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RESIDENCE: KERALA HC
Mr.Ramachandra Warrior v. Jayasree
The court in its recent judgement observed that, a divorced wife is not entitled to Right of residence as specified under Section 17 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, as the said right is available only to a woman in a domestic relationship. However, the court observed that a divorced wife occupying a shared household can be evicted only in accordance with law, as contemplated under Section 17(2) of the said Act. In the case of Sulaiman Kunju v. Nabeesa Beevi, 2015, it was held that a divorced wife is not entitled to get any of the reliefs under Section 19. However, in the case of Bipin v. Meera, 2016, the court had held that a divorced woman is entitled to invoke the provisions of Domestic Violence Act as against her husband.
DISCRIMINATION EVEN WITHOUT INTENT IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: SC
Lt Col Nitisha v. Union of India
The hon’ble Supreme Court in its landmark decision held that evaluation criteria adopted by the Indian Army to consider the grant of permanent commission to women officers to be “arbitrary and irrational”, and said this requirement should be removed as it causes women officers “systemic discrimination”.
A bench observed that the pattern of evaluation inherently caused economic and psychological harm to women short service commission officers(WSSCOs). The court also directed to implement its earlier ruling under the case of SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE V. BABITA PUNIYA, 2020 that struck down the directly discriminated practice of excluding WSSCOs from permanent commission.
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, who authored the judgement, observed that the doctrine of Indirect discrimination or Systemic discrimination is founding on the compelling insight that discrimination can often be a function, not of conscious design or malicious intent, but unconscious/implicit biases or an inability to recognize how existing structures and ways of doing thing, have the consequence of freezing an unjust status quo. In order to achieve substantive equality prescribed under the constitution, indirect discrimination, even sans discriminatory intent, must be prohibited.