Article 21 provides that “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”.

In a number of judgments, the Court has expanded the meaning of “life”. It has been held that the right to life enshrined in Article 21 “cannot be restricted to mere animal existence” and “means something much more than just physical survival”.[1] It includes the right to live with dignity.[2]

Dignity as a part of the basic structure of the Constitution

In fact, dignity forms a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.[3] The “references” to dignity are “found in the guarantee against arbitrariness (Article 14), the lamps of freedom (Article 19) and in the right to life and personal liberty (Article 21).”[4] Thus, dignity is the “core” which “unites the fundamental rights because the fundamental rights seek to achieve for each individual the dignity of existence”.

In that sense, human dignity is a constitutional value and a constitutional goal.[5] The Court has authoritatively ruled, “[t]o live is to live with dignity”. Human dignity is intrinsic to and inseparable from human existence.[6] Implicit in this right under Article 21 is “the right to protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.[7] There also exists “a close relationship between dignity and the quality of life”.[8] Dignity of human existence is fully realized only when one leads a quality life.

Dignity under Article 21 is an integral aspect of life, which requires sustenance of one’s being to the fullest.[9] One can truly embrace their identity, whether on the basis of caste, race, gender, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, only if they are given dignity. An individual’s dignity is fundamental to their sense of self and autonomy. Thus, the right to dignity “encapsulates the right of every individual to be treated as a self-governing entity having intrinsic value”.[10]

Above all, “there is a growing recognition that the true measure of development of a nation is not economic growth; it is human dignity.”[11] A nation must prioritize human dignity—ensuring that every person, regardless of their background or identity, is able to live with respect, equality, and freedom. Thus, human dignity forms the bedrock of social justice and a just, compassionate society.

The right to live with dignity extends even to the incarcerated. Not providing dignity to prisoners is a relic of the colonizers and pre-colonial mechanisms, where oppressive systems were designed to dehumanize and degrade those under the control of the State. Authoritarian regimes of the pre-constitutional era saw prisons not only as places of confinement but as tools of domination. Supreme Court, focusing on the changed legal framework brought out by the Constitution, has recognized that even prisoners are entitled to the right to dignity.

Court’s Rulings on right to live with dignity to Prisoners

A Constitution bench of Supreme Court in Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Administration[12] took serious note of the treatment meted out to undertrials, convicts, and those awaiting the death penalty. Justice Krishna Iyer, in his opinion, expounded:

“The humane thread of jail jurisprudence that runs right through is that no prison authority enjoys amnesty for unconstitutionality, and forced farewell to fundamental rights is an institutional outrage in our system where stone walls and iron bars shall bow before the rule of law.”

He emphasized the need to re-look at the prison conditions:

“A prison is a sound-proof planet, walled from view and visits regulated, and so, rights of prisoners are hardly visible, checking is more difficult and the official position of the repository of power inspires little credibility where the victims can be political protesters, unpopular figures, minority champions or artless folk who might fail to propitiate arrogant power of minor minions.”

Justice Krishna Iyer advocated for a humane system within prisons:

“In every country, this transformation from cruelty to compassion within jails has found resistance from the echelons and the Great Divide between pre-and post-Constitution penology has yet to get into the metabolism of the Prison Services. And so, on the national agenda of prison reform is on-going education for prison staff, humanisation of the profession and recognition of the human rights of the human beings in their keep.”

The Court admonished the usage of iron fetters and held that the practice of solitary confinement and cellular segregation as inhuman and irrational: “I hold that bar fetters are a barbarity generally and, like whipping, must vanish. Civilised consciousness is hostile to torture within the walled campus. We hold that solitary confinement, cellular segregation and marginally modified editions of the same process are inhuman and irrational.

More dangerous are these expedients when imposed by the unturned and untrained power of a jail superior who has, as part of his professional equipment, no course in human psychology, stressology or physiology, who has to depend on no medical or psychiatric examination prior to infliction of irons or solitary, who has no obligation to hear the victim before harming him, whose “reasons” are in English on the history tickets and therefore unknowable and in the Journal to which the prisoner has no access…

The law is not abracadabra but at once pragmatic and astute and does not surrender its power before scary exaggerations of security by prison bosses… Social justice cannot sleep if the Constitution hangs limp where its consumers most need its humanism.”

In Charles Sobraj v. Supdt., Central Jail,[13] Supreme Court upheld the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights of prisoners against the undue harshness of prison practices. Justice Krishna Iyer observed:

“a prison system may make rational distinctions in making assignments to inmates of vocational, educational and work opportunities available, but is constitutionally impermissible to do so without a functional classification system. The mere fact that a prisoner is poor or rich, high-born or ill-bred, is certainly irrational as a differentia in a ‘secular, socialist republic’…

The reason is, prisoners retain all rights enjoyed by free citizens except those lost necessarily as an incident of confinement. Moreover, the rights enjoyed by prisoners under Articles 14, 19 and 21, though limited, are not static and will rise to human heights when challenging situations arise.”

In Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration,[14] Supreme Court emphasized that a person in prison does not cease to be a human being or lose all human rights, and that it is the duty of the State to take care of justifiable needs and requests. It was held that “in the eye of law, prisoners are persons, not animals”, and that courts must “punish the deviant ‘guardians’ of the prison system where they go berserk and defile the dignity of the human inmate”.

Speaking for the Court, Justice Krishna Iyer held:

“Prison houses are part of Indian earth and the Indian Constitution cannot be held at bay by jail officials “dressed in a little, brief authority”, when Part III is invoked by a convict. For when a prisoner is traumatized, the Constitution suffers a shock… Whether inside prison or outside, a person shall not be deprived of his guaranteed freedom save by methods “right, just and fair”… Prisoners are peculiarly and doubly handicapped. For one thing, most prisoners belong to the weaker segment, in poverty, literacy, social station and the like.

Secondly, the prison house is a walled-off world which is incommunicado for the human world, with the result that the bonded inmates are invisible, their voices inaudible, their injustices unheeded. So it is imperative, as implicit in Article 21, that life or liberty, shall not be kept in suspended animation or congealed into animal existence without the freshening flow of fair procedure.”

The Court also noted down various injustices which may be committed against a prisoner:

“Inflictions may take many protean forms, apart from physical assaults. Pushing the prisoner into a solitary cell, denial of a necessary amenity, and, more dreadful sometimes, transfer to a distant prison where visits or society of friends or relations may be snapped, allotment of degrading labour, assigning him to a desperate or tough gang and the like, may be punitive in effect. Every such affliction or abridgment is an infraction of liberty or life in its wider sense and cannot be sustained unless Article 21 is satisfied.”

The Court in Kishore Singh Ravinder Dev v. State of Rajasthan[15] reiterated that the infliction of physical torture on the undertrial prisoner is a violation of Article 21. It was held that “the State must re-educate the constabulary out of their sadistic arts and inculcate a respect for the human person — a process which must begin more by example than by precept if the lower rungs are really to emulate”.

The Court ruled that if any escort policemen are found guilty of misconduct, the authorities must not allow a sense of police solidarity or internal camaraderie to shield the wrongdoing. There is no greater harm to our constitutional values than a State official acting recklessly and violating fundamental rights. The Court expressed hope that the root causes enabling police brutality will be addressed by the government with the seriousness it deserves.

The Court posed the question: “Who will police the police?”

In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,[16] the Court struck down a rule which regulated the right of a detenu to have interviews with a legal adviser of his choice as violative of Articles 14 and 21.

The Court held that “as part of the right to live with human dignity” and “as a necessary component of the right to life”, a detenu “would be entitled to have interviews with the members of his family and friends” and “to have interview with his legal adviser at any reasonable hour during the day after taking appointment from the Superintendent of the Jail”.

Such appointment, it was held, “should be given by the Superintendent without any avoidable delay.”

Correspondingly, when Sheela Barse,[17] a freelance journalist, sought permission to interview prisoners, Supreme Court held that the press and citizens are entitled to interview prisoners in order to ensure the availability of their rights under Article 21, subject to reasonable restrictions. It was noted,

“Prison administrators have the human tendency of attempting to cover up their lapses and so shun disclosure thereof… Interviews become necessary as otherwise the correct information may not be collected but such access has got to be controlled and regulated.”

In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa,[18] Supreme Court emphasized “great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life”. While confinement inherently restricts a person’s liberty, the limited freedom they retain becomes all the more valuable. The State has a strict duty of care in such situations, without exception. Supreme Court declared that if a person in police custody is deprived of life, except according to the procedure established by law, the wrongdoer is held accountable, and the State is ultimately responsible.

Supreme Court laid down guidelines on arrest and detention in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal,[19] while highlighting the constitutional violations caused due to custodial violence and deaths in police lock-ups. It noted, “If the functionaries of the Government become law-breakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every man would have the tendency to become law unto himself thereby leading to anarchism”.

In Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh,[20] it was noted that a person in custody has “his basic human rights” and human dignity, and that the police officers cannot treat him in an inhuman manner. It was held that even “any treatment meted out to an accused while he is in custody which causes humiliation and mental trauma corrodes the concept of human dignity”.

In Shabnam v. Union of India,[21] Supreme Court elucidated the principle that human dignity should be preserved even when a prisoner is sentenced to death. The Court held, “the process/procedure from confirmation of death sentence by the highest court till the execution of the said sentence, the convict is to be treated with human dignity to the extent which is reasonable and permissible in law”.

Similarly, in ‘X’ v. State of Maharashtra,[22] the Court while holding that “post-conviction severe mental illness will be a mitigating factor” in commuting the death sentence, emphasized that the “right to dignity of an accused does not dry out with the Judges’ ink, rather, it subsists well beyond the prison gates and operates until his last breath”.

Thus, the jurisprudence which emerges on the rights of prisoners under Article 21 is that even the incarcerated have inherent dignity. They are to be treated in a humanely and without cruelty. Police officers and prison officials cannot take any disproportionate measures against prisoners. The prison system must be considerate of the physical and mental health of prisoners. For instance, if a prisoner suffers from a disability, adequate steps have to be taken to ensure their dignity and to offer support.

Reference

Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India (2024)


[1] Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608

[2] Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161

[3]  Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225

[4] K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Privacy-9J.)

[5] Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 761

[6]  M. Nagaraj v. Union of India [M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212

[7] Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608

[8] Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1 [Justice Chandrachud]

[9]  Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1

[10] X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 9 SCC 433

[11]  National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438

[12] (1978) 4 SCC 494

[13] (1978) 4 SCC 104

[14] (1980) 3 SCC 488

[15] (1981) 1 SCC 503

[16] (1981) 1 SCC 608

[17] Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, (1987) 4 SCC 373

[18] (1993) 2 SCC 746

[19] (1997) 1 SCC 416

[20] (2012) 8 SCC 1

[21] 2015) 6 SCC 702

[22] (2019) 7 SCC 1