Preponderance of Probabilities in Civil Law
The court in a civil trial applies a standard of proof governed by a preponderance of probabilities. This standard is also described sometimes as a balance of probability or the preponderance of the evidence. “Phipson on Evidence” formulates the standard succinctly: If therefore, the evidence is such that the court can say “we think it more probable than not”, the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not.[1]
In Miller v Minister of Pensions[2], Lord Denning, J (as the Master of Rolls then was) defined the doctrine of the balance or preponderance of probabilities in the following terms:
“(1)… It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence, ‘of course it is possible, but not in the least probable’ the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.”
The law recognises that within the standard of preponderance of probabilities, there could be different degrees of probability. This was succinctly summarized by Denning, LJ in Bater v Bater[3], where he formulated the principle thus:
“So also in civil cases, the case must be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on that subject matter.”
The definition of the expression ‘proved’ in Section 3 of the Evidence Act is in the following terms:
“Proved’.–A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.”
Proof of a fact depends upon the probability of its existence. The finding of the court must be based on:
A. The test of a prudent person, who acts under the supposition that a fact exists; and
B. In the context and circumstances of a particular case.
Analysing this, Y V Chandrachud J (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in Dr N G Dastane v S Dastane[4] held:
“The belief regarding the existence of a fact may thus be founded on a balance of probabilities. A prudent man faced with conflicting probabilities concerning a fact-situation will act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he finds that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved.
The first step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the improbable at the second. Within the wide range of probabilities the court has often a difficult choice to make but it is this choice which ultimately determines where the preponderance of probabilities lies. Important issues like those which affect the status of parties demand a closer scrutiny than those like the loan on a promissory note:
“the nature and gravity of an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue [ Per Dixon, J. in Wright v. Wright, (1948) 77 CLR 191, 210]”; or as said by Lord Denning, “the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear [Blyth v. Blyth, (1966) 1 AER 524, 536]”.
But whether the issue is one of cruelty or of a loan on a pronote, the test to apply is whether on a preponderance of probabilities the relevant fact is proved. In civil cases this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for finding whether the burden of proof is discharged.”
The Court recognised that within the standard of preponderance of probabilities, the degree of probability is based on the subject matter involved.
In State of U P v Krishna Gopal[5], this Court observed:
“26. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge.”
[1] Phipson on Evidence, 16th Edn. at pgs 154-155
[2] (1947) 2 ALL ER 372
[3] [1951] P. 35
[4] (1975) 2 SCC 326
[5] (1988) 4 SCC 302