The 155th Article of the Constitution provides for the mode of the appointment of the governor. It provides,
“155. Appointment of Governor
The Governor of a State shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal.”
The speeches made by some of the members of the Constituent Assembly on Article 155 of the Constitution broadly encapsulate the ideas which were debated and rejected before nomination was selected as the mode of appointment for the Governor.
Speeches in Favour
Speaking in favour of appointment of Governors by Presidential nomination, Shri. H.V. Kamath was of the opinion that the concept of an elected Governor would undermine the structure of the country as a Union of States, since a Governor elected directly by the people on the basis of adult suffrage would place more emphasis on India being a federation. However, according to him, “the emphasis today is more upon the Union pattern of our State than upon its Federal aspect”
He believed that an elected Governor, being a partisan figure, would inevitably clash with the Chief Minister, thereby disrupting the functioning of a cabinet-style government. According to him, the role of a constitutional head should be impartial and symbolic, and the nomination system was better suited to uphold these principles. He further elaborated on the potential tussle that would ensue between an elected Governor and the Chief Minister of the State as follows:
“[…] If the Governor were to be elected by the direct vote of all voters in a province he is very likely to be a party-man with strong views of his own, and considering that he will be elected by the whole province—by the entire adult population of the province— he will think that he is a far superior man and a far more powerful man that the Chief Minister or Premier of the State who will be returned from one constituency only, but because he happens to be the leader of the majority party, he will be nominated Premier by the Governor. There will be two conflicting authorities within the State :
one is the Premier, whom, under this Constitution which we are considering today, we have invested with executive authority so far as the State is concerned, and the other is the Governor, who, though the Constitution does not confer on him very substantial powers and functions, will arrogate much to himself, because he will say that “I have been elected by the people of the whole province and as such I am persona gratia with the people and not the Chief Minister”.
Therefore, there will be in the administration of the province at every turn—if not at every turn, then very often—points of conflicts or friction between the elected Governor and the elected Chief Minister. Therefore, I think we have done very wisely in deleting or in doing away with the system of election for the Provincial Governor.”[1]
Shri. Hukam Singh, opting for the middle path, acknowledged the difficulties inherent in both pure election and pure nomination for the purpose of appointment of Governors. While agreeing with Shri. H.V. Kamath on the drawbacks of an elected Governor, such as the potential for conflict with the Chief Minister and the high costs involved in conducting elections, he proposed a balanced alternative, suggesting that a panel of candidates be nominated by the State legislature and a Governor be chosen from the said panel. This method, while allowing for some discretion would also ensure public accountability since the merits of those individuals who had been recommended in the panel would be publicly available and if the right person was not chosen, then the selection would also be criticized publicly. In his view, this approach would reduce favoritism, enhance transparency, and provide a safeguard against the abuse of power, striking a middle ground between the extremes of election and direct nomination.
Opposition of the nomination method appointment of the Governor
Shri. Rohini Kumar Chaudhari opposed the nomination of Governors, cautioning that a Centre-appointed Governor belonging to a different political party than the provincial government could lead to discord and undermine provincial autonomy. The friction that would result from adopting a system wherein Governors are elected would also exist, according to him, when a Governor is nominated, since the nominee of the President would not work in harmonious tandem with the Ministry of the State which belongs to a different political party than the one which enjoys power at the Centre.
He argued that electing Governors would ensure that they are more attuned to the needs of all communities, including marginalized groups like tribal populations in States where the Governor would have an even more important role to play. He criticized the reliance on British precedents and advocated for a more democratic process, such as election or selection from a panel, to reflect the will of the people and to also safeguard provincial interests.
Shri. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar was of the view that since the Governor is merely a constitutional head of the province and the real executive power had been vested in a ministry responsible to the Lower House of the different States, it seemed rather unnecessary, under such circumstances, to adopt the method of election based on universal suffrage for the appointment of the Governors. The nomination of Governors by the President would, in his opinion, mitigate constitutional conflicts and foster harmonious relations between the Governor and the provincial Cabinet. He argued that an elected Governor, deriving authority from universal suffrage, might assert dominance over the Cabinet, leading to significant constitutional risks. He specifically remarked that,
“In the normal working of the Government also there is danger of a clash between the Minister and the Governor, whereas the whole basis of the constitutional structure we are erecting depends upon the harmony between the legislature and the executive, and between the executive and the formal head of the Government”.[2]
Drawing inspiration from the Canadian model, he suggested that the President’s appointment of Governors, guided by the advice of the provincial Cabinet, would ensure stability and sound governance. Furthermore, according to him, “Nowhere does the system of election of the Governor exist where the Institution of responsible government is the main feature of the Constitution”. He believed that this system would better serve the interests of the provinces and the nation as a whole.
It was his belief that while the method of nomination was the most appropriate one, a convention of appointing Governors in consultation with the State government would grow. This, when read with the other discussions which took place in the Constituent Assembly, indicate that the framers of the Constitution reposed trust that the Governor would not be a cipher of the Central government, would be a person above party politics and would not attempt to override the State government with his actions. He also supported the idea of having nominated Governors on the ground that the intervention of the Governor would be required only in extraordinary situations, and an elected Governor may come in conflict with the provincial Cabinet by trying to override their decisions. His words are reproduced below:
“I see no objection to the appointment of the Governor being left to the President of the Union who has necessarily to act on the advice of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. A convention, of consulting the provincial Cabinet might easily grow up. Such a convention, as the House is aware, has grown up in the appointment of Governors in Canada. In Australia too, though under a different Constitution, a similar convention has grown up and the Governor of a State is appointed on the advice of the provincial Cabinet. […] There is another aspect also which the House might take into consideration. In our Constitution we must try every method by which harmony could be secured between the Centre and the provinces. If you have a person who is not elected by the province or the State but you have a person appointed by the President of the Union with the consent, I take it, of the provincial Cabinet, you will add a close link between the Centre and the provinces and a clash between the provinces and the Centre will be avoided which will otherwise occasionally result.
Then there is another point. It is said that the Governor may occasionally have to use his extraordinary powers. This point is more in favour of nomination rather than in favour of election. If the person who is elected on the basis of universal suffrage is to come into clash with the provincial Cabinet and if he is to set himself above the provincial Cabinet, there will be a greater constitutional danger. Even if circumstances arise when intervention by the Governor is necessary it will be only on extraordinary occasions.
Even for that intervention a person who is nominated or appointed by the President with the concurrence of the provincial Cabinet is likely to take far greater care than a person who is elected by the people. On the whole, in the interest of harmony, in the interests of good working, in the interests of sounder relations between the provincial Cabinet and the Governor, it will be much better if we adopt the Canadian model and have the Governors appointed by the President with the convention growing up that the Cabinet at the Centre would also be guided by the advice of the provincial Cabinet.”
Shri. P.S. Deshmukh was of the opinion that there exist a few fundamental considerations which have to be kept in mind while discussing the appointment of the Governor. The first of these fundamental considerations was that, “if we decide that the Governor should be elected by the province on the basis of adult franchise, then it follows logically that he should be a real executive authority. On the other hand, if you want him to be mere figurehead, if you want him to have exactly the same position as he has today under the 1935 Act and which is exactly the position which is assigned to him under the Draft Constitution, you cannot but have him appointed by the President.”
In light of this, he buttressed his view that Governors must be nominated and not elected. Regarding the concern that adopting a system of nominating the Governor would give undue power to the Prime Minister and the President, he opined that the Prime Minister would also be a popular Prime Minister and that he can only be there as long as he has the support of the Parliament elected by the people at large. Therefore, his view was that we must not hesitate in giving powers of patronage to the Prime Minister or the President. He also expressed concerns about the potential discord between an elected Governor and the Chief Minister or Premier, which could disrupt governance.
Apart from the very real possibility of conflicts between the elected Governor and the Chief Minister which necessitated appointment via nomination, he argued, on the other hand that, if there was no conflict and there was perfect agreement or collusion between the Governor and the Chief Minister, they could agree in defying the Centre altogether and that would put the Centre in a precarious position where they would be completely blocked out from the States.
Therefore, he remarked that, “But apart from the conflict, if there is no conflict and there is perfect agreement, if these two gentlemen set the Centre at naught, what will be the position?”
Hence, in his opinion, the appointment of Governors by the President would maintain a balance of power and ensure some degree of Central influence over provincial matters. He further suggested that Governors should serve at the pleasure of the President, thereby eliminating the need for impeachment provisions and also reinforcing the oversight of the Centre.
Shri. Hriday Nath Kunzru highlighted the potential for friction between Governors and their Cabinets, specifically with reference to Article 175 of the Draft Constitution, which has now been adopted as Article 200. By drawing comparisons to the Canadian model, he argued that empowering the President to disallow provincial bills directly by overriding the assent of the Governor within a certain prescribed period of time from the date of such assent, rather than relying on the Governors as intermediaries who refer the bill for the consideration of the President, would centralize responsibility with the Central Executive and reduce conflicts at the provincial level. In his view, this approach would align with the principles of responsible government and ensure smoother governance.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized the need to foster unity and avoid separatist tendencies within the nation. He believed that an elected Governor could exacerbate provincial divisions and weaken ties with the Centre. In his opinion, “Nevertheless a certain convention and practice helps or hinders the growth of separatist tendencies. I feel that if we have an elected Governor that would to some extent encourage that separatist provincial tendency more than otherwise. There will be far fewer common links with the Centre.”
He argued that duplicating the electoral process for the office of Governor would be unnecessary and counterproductive, leading to conflicts, wastage of resources, and disruptive tendencies. Supporting the nomination of Governors, he asserted that this approach would align with the parliamentary system of democracy and strengthen the relationship between the provinces and the Centre.
Reference
State of Tamilnadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu (2025)
[1] 8, CONSTITUENT ASSEMB. DEB., (May 30, 1949) 428-429
[2] 8, CONSTITUENT ASSEMB. DEB, (May 30, 1949) 431.