Section 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872, provides that when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession.
The basis on which this provision is found is that if a person makes a confession implicating himself that may suggest that the maker of the confession is speaking the truth.
The reason of the provision
Normally, if a statement made by an accused person is found to be voluntary and it amounts to a confession in the sense that it implicates the maker, it is not likely that the maker would implicate himself untrue, and so, s. 30 provides that such a confession may be taken into consideration even against a co-accused who is being tried along with the maker of the confession. There is no doubt that a confession made voluntarily by an accused person can be used against the maker of the confession, though as a matter of prudence criminal courts generally require some corroboration to the said confession Particularly if it has been retracted.
Confession of Co-Accused is not the Evidence
It is clear that the confession mentioned in s. 30 is not evidence under s. 3 of the Act. Sec. 3 defines “evidence” as meaning and including-
(1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence;
(2) all documents produced for the inspection of the Court; Such documents are called documentary evidence.
Technically construed, this definition will not apply to a confession.
- Part (1) of the definition refers to oral statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it; and clearly, a confession made by an accused person is not such a statement. It is not made or permitted to be made before the court that tries the criminal case.
- Part (2) of the definition refers to documents produced for the inspection of the court; and a confession cannot be said to fall even under this part.
Even so, s. 30 provides that a confession may be taken into consideration not only against its maker, but also against a co-accused person; that is to say, though such a confession may not be evidence as strictly defined by s. 3 of the Act, it is an element which may be taken into consideration by the criminal court and in that sense, it may be described as evidence in a non- technical way.
But it is significant that like other evidence which is produced before the Court, it is not obligatory on the court to take the confession into account. When evidence as defined by the Act is produced before the Court, it is the duty of the Court to consider that evidence. What weight should be attached to such evidence, is a matter in the discretion of the Court. But a Court cannot say in respect of such evidence that it will just not take that evidence into account.
Such an approach can, however, be adopted by the Court in dealing with a confession, because s. 30 merely enables the Court to take the confession into account.
Confession can be used as Corroborative Evidence
In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against another accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right.
As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbuttv a confession can only be used to “lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused“.
In re. Peryaswami Noopan, Reilly J. observed that the provision of s. 30 goes not further than this:
“Where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in s. 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.”
In Bhuboni Sahu v. King the Privy Council has expressed the same view. Sir. John Beaumont who spoke for the Board observed that a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of “evidence” contained in s. 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities.
Section 30, however, provides that the Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the case, it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence.”
It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained in s. 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense.
The court cannot start the case on the basis of just a confession
Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of s. 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by s. 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person.
It must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence.
That, briefly stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in s. 30.
Position of Evidence given by an accomplice under Section 133
While explaining the provisions contained, in s. 30, it may be useful to refer to the position of the evidence given by an accomplice under s. 133 of the Act. Section 133 provides that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and that conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
Illustration (b) to s. 114 of the Act brings out the legal position that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Reading these two provisions together, it follows that though an accomplice is a competent witness, prudence requires that his evidence should not be acted upon unless it is materially corroborated; and that is the effect of judicial decisions dealing with this point.
The point of significance is that when the Court deals with the evidence by an accomplice, the Court may treat the said evidence as substantive evidence and enquire whether it is materially corroborated or not. The testimony of the accomplice is evidence under s. 3 of the Act and has to be dealt with as such. It is no doubt evidence of a tainted character and as such, is very weak; but, nevertheless, it is evidence and may be acted upon, subject to the requirement which has now become virtually a part of the law that it is corroborated in material particulars.
Position of the statement of Co-accused
The statements contained in the confessions of the co- accused persons stand on a different footing. In cases where such confessions are relied upon by the prosecution against an accused person, the Court cannot begin with the examination of the said statements. The stage to consider the said confessional statements arrives only after the other evidence is considered and found to be satisfactory. The difference in the approach which the Court has to adopt in dealing with these two types of evidence is thus clear, well-understood and well-established.
Hari Charan Kurmi and Jogia Hazam v. State of Bihar, (1964)
 (1911) I.L.R. 38 Cal. 559 at p. 588.
 (1913) I.L.R. 54 Mad. 75 at p. 77
 (1949) 76 I.A. 147 at p. 155
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